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STATE AID TO RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS: FROM
EVERSONTO ZELMANA CRITICAL REVIEW
Dr. Mark J. Chadsey*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris was the latest salvo in a long conflict over state aid to
religious schools in America, but will not end the battle over
this controversial issue. Both sides in the argument continue
to press their position before various branches and levels of
government.2 To fully understand the implications of the
Zelman decision, it is important to have a sense of case his-
tory in this area. To that end, Part II of this article presents
a critical review of most of the major cases involving state aid
to religious schools prior to Zelman. Part III of this article
briefly examines the social and educational pressures that
have pushed public opinion and school officials toward in-
creasing acceptance of voucher programs. Part IV offers a fo-
cused discussion of Zelman following which I conclude that
voucher programs, if properly designed, are constitutional. In
keeping with the Court's decision, I argue that to find such
programs constitutional the Court must conclude that the
state is neutral as between the religious and nonreligious
school choice. To conclude that the state is acting in a neutral
* Dr. Chadsey is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political
Science and International Studies at SUNY College at Brockport. Dr. Chadsey
earned his Ph.D. at the University at Buffalo in 1996 and his Juris Doctorate at
Columbia University in 1986. Dr. Chadsey would like to thank his parents,
Bradford and June, his wife Deborah and his children Meghan and Bradford for
their sacrifices and loving support which have made his academic career possi-
ble.
1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Associated Press, House Approves a Voucher Plan for Poor
Washington Students, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2003, at A12 (reporting that the
House of Representatives had approved a voucher plan for Washington D.C.).
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manner, the Court must determine that the state is not coerc-
ing parents to register their children in religious schools. In
deciding whether parents are coerced, the Court may look at
the entire range of options available to parents when choosing
a school for their child, including public schools not formally a
part of the voucher program as designed by the state.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AND THE
STATE
A. The Early Cases: Everson, McCollum, and Zorach
Everson v. Board of Education was the first case in
which the Supreme Court considered whether the state might
offer any assistance to those who wish to attend sectarian
schools. In Everson, the question was whether the state of
New Jersey could authorize local school boards to reimburse
parents of children attending parochial schools for money
they spent on bus transportation to and from school.4 The
New Jersey taxpayer who objected to the statute argued that
the statute "forced inhabitants to pay taxes to help support
and maintain schools which are dedicated to, and which regu-
larly teach, the Catholic Faith."'
After a brief, and somewhat incomplete,6 review of the
history surrounding the adoption of the Establishment
Clause, Justice Black concluded:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither
can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion .... No tax in any amount,
3. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court had earlier taken up the question of
whether the state can prohibit parents from sending their children to sectarian
schools in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), but that case in-
volved no state aid to religious schools.
4. Everson, 330 U.S. at 5.
5. Id.
6. Justice Black's analysis led him to conclude that the Establishment
Clause was intended to provide the same protection against governmental in-
trusion on religious liberty as the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, originally
written by Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 12-13. Contra Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 91-99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court is mistaken
in assuming that the Establishment Clause protections and prohibitions mirror
those found in the Virginia statute).
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large or small, can be levied to support any religious ac-
tivities or institutions .... Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the af-
fairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against estab-
lishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of
separation between church and state."7
Despite this strong language, the Court held that the
New Jersey statute was constitutional, noting that the state
of New Jersey was acting in a neutral manner because it was
authorizing the reimbursement "as part of a general program
under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and
other schools."8 According to the Everson Court, neutrality
was the key to understanding the Establishment Clause as it
relates to state support of religious education.9 The Court
noted that the Establishment Clause "requires the state to be
neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adver-
sary."10
Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jack-
son, and Burton, dissented and argued for a much more re-
strictive interpretation of the Establishment Clause:
The Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the
official establishment of a single sect, creed or religion,
outlawing only a formal relation such as had prevailed in
England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was to
uproot all such relationships. But the object was broader
than separating church and state in this narrow sense. It
was to create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by compre-
hensively forbidding every form of public aid or support
for religion."
The kind of complete and permanent separation for
which the dissent argued was, of course, impossible to achieve
absent a willingness to deny religious institutions the most
basic services offered by the state. As the majority opinion
pointed out, the wall of separation had already been breached
7. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 164 (1878)).
8. Id. at 17.
9. Id. at 18.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 31-32.
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when the state provided police and fire protection as well as
sewage treatment and sidewalks to churches. 2 Unless the
Constitution requires that the state stand by and watch
churches burn to the ground or rabbis be mugged in broad
daylight, complete separation is not possible.
Next, the Court was called upon to decide whether chil-
dren could participate in a "release time" program when reli-
gious education classes were taught on public school grounds.
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,3 a local
school board in Illinois agreed to allow religious instruction
teachers of various faiths to teach in public schools. In order
for children to participate, their parents had to sign a request
card granting permission for the student to attend the
classes. 4 Children whose parents did not want them to take
such classes were required to continue their regularly sched-
uled classes. 5
The Court struck the program down on the grounds that
the program utilized a "tax-established and tax-supported
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their
faith."6 The Court made no effort to devise an Establishment
Clause "test" beyond endorsing the dissenters' views in Ever-
son by arguing that the "First Amendment has erected a wall
between church and state which must be kept high and im-
pregnable."'7 The Court said that the Establishment Clause
required that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion.""
Justice Reed, the lone dissenter in McCollum, took issue
with the idea of interpreting the Establishment Clause as re-
quiring a wall of separation between church and state. Jus-
tice Reed pointed out that Thomas Jefferson, the author of
that phrase, supported the teaching of religion at the Univer-
12. Id at 16, 17.
13. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
14. Id. at 207.
15. Id at 209.
16. Id at 210.
17. Id at 212. The Court further indicated its approval of the dissenting
view in Everson with two footnotes that quoted the dissenters at length. Id at
210 nn.6 & 7.
18. Id at 210.
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sity of Virginia, which he founded.19 Justice Reed argued that
the actions of people like Thomas Jefferson and James Madi-
son were better indicators of their views regarding the First
Amendment than abstract "figures of speech""° like "wall of
separation" between church and state. Justice Reed's dissent
is particularly salient given that Jefferson penned the ubiqui-
tous phrase in a private letter to the Danbury Baptist Asso-
ciation fourteen years after the adoption of the Bill of
Rights.21 Logic dictates that official public speeches and ac-
tions of individuals during, or shortly after the period when
the First Amendment was passed provide better, albeit im-
perfect, insights into their interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clause than does private correspondence a decade and a
half later. After all, those who might have been inclined to
rely on Jefferson's lead could hardly be expected to have
based their decision on statements he made in private corre-
spondence fourteen years after they considered the issue.
In Zorach v. CIauson,22 the Court was called upon to de-
cide if New York State could release students, during the
school day and at their parents' request, to attend religious
instruction classes. Unlike the local school board in
McCollum, however, New York State required that the
classes be taught off public school property.
In what may appear to be paradoxical language, the
Court found the "release time" program constitutional, stat-
ing
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First
Amendment reflects the philosophy that the Church and
State should be separated. And so far as interference with
the "free exercise" of religion and an "establishment" of re-
ligion are concerned, the separation must be complete and
unequivocal .... The First Amendment, however, does
not say that in every and all respects there shall be a
separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously de-
fines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall
be no concern or union or dependency one on the other."
The language appeared paradoxical because the Court
19. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 245-46.
20. Id. at 247.
21. Id. at 244 n.8.
22. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
23. Id. at 312.
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seemed to suggest that the Constitution required a wall of
separation that was "complete and unequivocal ... and abso-
lute," while maintaining that this absolute rule did not apply
in "every and all respects."24 Properly understood, the appar-
ent contradiction in the Court's opinion disappears. The
Court was simply suggesting that in cases where the state
was actually attempting to establish a church or interfere
with anyone's free exercise rights, the wall of separation was
absolute. In cases like Zorach, however, where no one could
reasonably argue that the state's intention was to actually
"establish" a religion, the Constitution allowed states leeway.
Provided that the state abides by the rule that "[tlhe govern-
ment must be neutral when it comes to competition between
sects, " " the states had room to accommodate the religious de-
sires of their citizens.
The approach taken in Zorach was, as the Court sug-
gested, in keeping with "the common sense of the matter."26 If
the state's action suggested an intention to actually "estab-
lish" a church, favor one church over another, or interfere
with anyone's freedom of conscience, the Constitution would
require an impregnable wall of separation. As the state's ac-
tion moved further and further away from "establishment" or
"interference," the Court would interpret the Constitution as
permitting greater interplay between church and state. The
neutrality approach insisted upon by the Court allowed those
parents who wanted formal religious training to be a part of
their children's schooling to obtain such education. 27  Simi-
larly, it allowed those parents who did not want their children
exposed to religious views of any kind to shield their offspring
from religious education.2"
The Court next took on the issue of school prayer in
Engel v. Vitale.29 In Engel, parents of ten students sued New
York for allowing children to recite the following voluntary
nondenominational prayer in its public schools: "Almighty
God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
24. Id.
25. Id. at 314.
26. Id. at 312.
27. Id. at 314.
28. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314.




The Court held that New York had violated the Constitu-
tion by allowing its Board of Regents to compose the prayer
and by further allowing students to recite it in public
schools." Once again, the Court made no attempt to offer any
Establishment Clause "test" for use in such cases. The Court
did argue that the neutrality requirement established in
Everson and Zorach would not be sufficient to save public
school prayer: "Neither the fact that the prayer may be de-
nominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the
part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the
limitations of the Establishment Clause."3
In Zorach, the Court had established the principle that
the closer the state's action came to "establishing" an official
religion, the greater the degree of scrutiny the Constitution
required. Engel extended this principle by noting that a more
demanding standard of review would apply to action that
"does not amount to a total establishment of one particular
religious sect to the exclusion of all others."33 The Court indi-
cated just how far it was willing to extend the scope of the Es-
tablishment Clause's prohibition when it noted that "the gov-
ernmental endorsement of that prayer seems relatively
insignificant when compared to the governmental encroach-
ments upon religion which were commonplace 200 years
ago."34 The Court found justification for this expansion of
scrutiny to cases involving "relatively insignificant" acts of
encroachment in James Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance Against Religious Assessments.5 Quoting Madison,
30. Id. at 422.
31. Id. at 430.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 436.
34. Id. This acknowledgement by the Court seems very enlightening. It con-
cedes that the generation that proposed and adopted the First Amendment
acted as if it believed the Clause allowed much greater interplay between relig-
ion and the state. It also appears to acknowledge that the Court cast aside the
actions, beliefs and desires of this broader group of founders in favor of the
views of Madison and Jefferson. This seems an especially suspect mode of in-
terpretation given that Jefferson played no role in drafting the Bill of Rights
and the words of Madison most frequently relied upon by the Court were not
written in response to the First Amendment. See discussion infra pp. 706-07.
35. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As-
sessments, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298-306 (William T. Hutchin-
son et al. eds., 1962).
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the Court wrote:
It is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our
liberties .... Who does not see that the same authority
which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other
Religions, may establish with the same ease any particu-
lar sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That
the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute
three pence only of his property for the support of any one
establishment, may force him to conform to any other es-
tablishment in all cases whatsoever?
36
Implicitly or explicitly, this language appears to underlie
many of the Court's decisions to strike down actions of the
state over the ensuing decades. As a result, it is important to
pay particular attention to how the Court interprets this lan-
guage in Engel.
The Court argued that Madison's warnings suggest a
need to strike down state actions that fall well short of "estab-
lishing" official state religions.3 ' The attempt to support such
a conclusion with Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance,
however, was flawed in at least two respects.
The first problem with the Court's use of Madison's lan-
guage is that Madison wrote the text to protest a bill before
the Virginia legislature.8 Implicitly, the Court would have us
accept that because James Madison was the author of the
Memorial and Remonstrance in Virginia and helped draft the
First Amendment, his thoughts in the former case are appli-
cable to the latter. To establish a conclusion of this kind, the
Court needs much more convincing evidence than it has ever
offered. While there may have been a great deal of overlap
between Madison's positions in both instances, that fact does
not preclude the possibility that there may have been signifi-
cant differences also.39  That Madison was capable of great
36. Engel, 370 U.S. at 436.
37. See id.
38. Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance was written in opposition to a
bill before the Virginia legislature entitled "Bill Establishing a Provision for
Teachers of Religion" in 1785. The Bill of Rights was taken up in the first ses-
sion of Congress and ratified in 1791. See generally CHARLES F. JAMES,
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
VIRGINIA (1971) (describing fully the events leading up to Madison's publication
of Memorial and Remonstrance).
39. Cf Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91, 93 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that Madison's remarks in support of the Establishment Clause,
unlike his opposition to religious taxes in Virginia, "were less those of a dedi-
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shifts in position is clear. As one of the authors of the Feder-
alist Papers, for instance, he was one of the nation's great
spokespersons for the federalist position; but, by the time he
arrived at the first session of Congress, he had become a lead-
ing advocate of the anti-federalist position.4 °
Second, even if the Memorial and Remonstrance did shed
light on a document it did not address, the Court can fairly be
said to have misinterpreted its meaning because the Court re-
lied too heavily upon the abstract language of the first sen-
tence of the quote. It fell prey to the mistake Justice Reed
had attempted to warn about in his dissent in McCollum re-
garding Jefferson's "wall of separation between church and
state" statement. Read by itself, the abstract language in the
first sentence of Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance can
be interpreted as requiring super-sensitivity to any action by
the state involving religion." As Justice Reed had suggested
in McCollum, however, reliance upon such "figures of speech"
can be very misleading."
Had the Court examined the remainder of the quoted
passage, it would have concluded that Madison was not argu-
ing for super-sensitivity in every instance. Madison provided
us with specific examples of what he considered the kinds of
"first experiments with our liberties" that ought to arouse
alarm. 3 The actual establishment of Christianity in exclu-
sion to all other religions ought to alarm us, according to
Madison, as should the imposition of even a small tax to sup-
port an established religion.'
What the Court ought to have noticed about Madison's
examples is that they involve actual establishment of one
kind or another-Christianity over all other kinds of religion
cated advocate of the wisdom of such measures than those of a prudent states-
man . . ."). Rehnquist continued to note that, in a letter to Jefferson, Madison
suggested that he did not even feel a Bill of Rights was necessary. Id. at 98.
40. See, e.g., EDWARD MCNALL BURNS, JAMES MADISON: PHILOSOPHER OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1938); NEAL RIEMER, JAMES MADISON: CREATING THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1986); ROBERT MORGAN, JAMES MADISON ON THE
CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS (1988); cf LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED
FIRE OF LIBERTY, JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING 'OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC (1995).
41. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948)
(Reed, J., dissenting).
42. See id.
43. Madison, supra note 35, at 300.
44. Id.
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in the first case, and a tax to support an established church in
the second. Madison's examples strongly suggest that the trip
wire attached to our Establishment Clause early warning sys-
tem ought to break if, and only if, there is some legitimate
threat whereby the state's action may lead to the establish-
ment of state religion. There is no reason to read Madison's
words as a directive to declare state actions unconstitutional
if those actions pose no realistic threat of a state establishing
a church.45
B. Creating a Test.- Schempp, Allen, Walz, and Lemon
In School District of Abington v. Schempp,"6 the Court
took the first steps in laying down an Establishment Clause
"test." The question before the Court in Schempp was
whether the state of Pennsylvania could allow the school day
to begin with readings from the Bible in public schools.47 The
state excused students from the reading if their parents ob-
jected. The Court held:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose
and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of the legislative power as circumscribed
by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that nei-
ther advances nor inhibits religion. 8
The Court found that Bible reading constituted "a reli-
gious ceremony and was intended by the State to be so."
,4 9
The state's purpose was therefore to advance religion. The
Court again noted "that the religious practices here may be
relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment."5
And, once again, the Court cited Madison's language from the
45. It is possible to conclude that when a state composes a prayer and al-
lows it to be recited in public schools that this action is sufficiently close to ac-
tual "establishment" to be a cause for alarm. The nondenominational nature of
the prayer and the fact that participation is voluntary certainly mitigates these
concerns to some degree. Whether school prayer, under such circumstances,
constitutes a genuine threat of establishment or is, in the Court's language, a
relatively insignificant action, I am happy to leave for others to decide for now.
46. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
47. Id. at 205.
48. Id. at 222.
49. Id. at 223.
50. Id. at 225.
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Memorial and Remonstrance to the effect that "it is proper to
take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties"5' as justi-
fication for striking down a "relatively minor encroachment."52
For whatever reason, the Court chose to quote only the most
abstract language from Madison's work, neglecting to provide
readers with Madison's own examples of the kinds of "first
experiments with our liberties" that ought to cause alarm.
The Court did offer another implicit justification for
striking down "relatively minor encroachments" on the First
Amendment when it argued that "the First Amendment, in
its final form, did not simply bar a congressional enactment
establishing a church; it forbade all laws respecting an estab-
lishment of religion. Thus, this Court has given the Amend-
ment a 'broad interpretation'.... .""
The implicit argument was that the First Amendment
did not just ban the establishment of religion; it banned ac-
tions "respecting" establishment of religion. The Court was
entitled to give a broad reading to the prohibitions of the
First Amendment because it banned much more than just the
actual establishment of a religion. The modifier "respecting"
justified expanding the reach of the First Amendment to
strike down laws that involved "relatively minor encroach-
ments" of the state into the field of religion.
Building upon this premise, the Court shifted the nature
of the enquiry away from the neutrality standard required in
Everson and devised the two-part test of Schempp. The stan-
dard would no longer require the state to be neutral on the is-
sue of religion, rather the state's action must have neither the
purpose nor effect of promoting religion.
In several respects, the Court's analysis was once again
flawed. First, the Court, in neither Schempp nor McGowan v.
Marylandt offered us historical evidence to substantiate its
interpretation of the word "respecting." The use of the word
"respecting" does clearly modify the terms "establishment of
religion." Thus, the First Amendment's requirement that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
51. Id.
52. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
53. Id. at 220 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1961)
(upholding Sunday closing laws against a First Amendment challenge)).
54. 366 U.S. 420 (1961), quoted in Schempp, 374 U.S. at 220.
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religion"55 implies a broader prohibition than the words,
"Congress shall make no law establishing religion." The ex-
tent of this broadness is difficult to measure because neither
the first Congress nor Madison left very much legislative his-
tory on point.
Just as the inclusion of the word "respecting" implies a
broadening of the prohibitions of the First Amendment, so too
the word "establishment" implies some limitations on those
prohibitions. The failure to recognize this fact leads to the
second flaw in the Court's interpretation. In striking down
state actions which result in "relatively minor encroach-
ments" on religion, 6 the Court appeared to be reading the
First Amendment as if it provided that "Congress shall make
no law respecting religion." The First Amendment does not
prohibit Congress from making laws respecting religion; it
prohibits Congress from making laws respecting the estab-
lishment of religion. The "establishment" modifier must be
given the same interpretive weight as the word "respecting."
The language appears to provide the Court with justifica-
tion for striking down laws that fall short of actual estab-
lishment, provided they could reasonably be considered laws
respecting establishment. Had the founders wished to pro-
vide the nation with the broader prohibition insisted upon by
the Court in Schempp, they were certainly skilled enough to
draft such language. Representative Samuel Livermore had,
in fact, put forth a proposal that the Amendment should read,
"Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing
the rights of conscience. " "
In Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 v.
Allen," the Court relied on the two-part test established in
Schempp to determine that a New York statute requiring lo-
cal school boards to loan textbooks to students free of charge
was constitutional.59 The Court said that the "express pur-
pose" of the New York statute was the furtherance of educa-
tional opportunities for students.' The statute passed the
first prong of the Schempp test because its purpose was nei-
55. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
57. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
58. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
59. See id. at 243-44.
60. Id. at 243.
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ther to advance nor inhibit religion."1 The Court never explic-
itly addressed the second prong of the test, which requires
that the "primary effect" of the statute neither advance nor
inhibit religion. The Court did, however, reject the plaintiffs
argument that the secular and religious components of paro-
chial education could not be separated with respect to text-
books." Had the Court not reached this conclusion, the stat-
ute would almost certainly have failed the second prong of the
test. If the Court found that textbooks in all subjects were
useful to the religious mission of sectarian education, then
certainly the lending of a math or physics text would have
had the "primary effect" of advancing religion. The Court, at
least temporarily, rejected this argument.63
Next, the Court was called upon to decide if tax exemp-
tions for religious property violated the Establishment
Clause. In Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York,'
the appellant sought to prevent the city from granting tax ex-
emptions to religious properties that were used exclusively for
religious purposes. Such tax exemptions "indirectly re-
quire[d] the appellant to make a contribution to religious bod-
ies"65 which violated the prohibitions of the Establishment
Clause, according to the appellant. The Court rejected the
claim.
Applying the two-part test first used in Schempp, the
Court found that "[t]he legislative purpose of the property tax
exemption is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of
religion."6  Underlying this portion of the Court's decision
61. Id.
62. Id. at 245.
63. The Court reversed itself and rejected this conclusion in dicta in Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973), noting that "[a]id normally may be thought to
have the primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in
which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are sub-
sumed in the religious mission ... ." This statement suggested that the Court
would no longer look at the content of instructional materials but rather at the
content of the overall education to decide if the instructional materials aid the
religious mission. See id. at 749 (upholding, on other grounds, a statute that
allowed the state to issue revenue bonds that were used to finance a capital pro-
ject for Baptist College at Charleston); see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975) (Using this language, the Court declared the portion of a Pennsylvania
statute that provided instructional material and equipment to religious schools
unconstitutional.).
64. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
65. Id. at 667.
66. Id. at 672.
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was the Court's recognition that New York "has not singled
out one particular church or religious group or even churches
as such; rather, it has granted exemption to all houses of reli-
gious worship within a broad class of property owned by non-
profit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, li-
braries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and
patriotic groups." 7
Next, the Court turned to the second "effect" prong of the
Schempp test. The "effect" that the Court said must be
avoided was "excessive government entanglement with relig-
ion."68 Excessive entanglement occurred when the statute in
question results in a relationship between church and state
that requires "official and continuing surveillance" by the
government of church affairs.69 The Court found that "[t]he
exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement
between church and state and far less than taxation of
churches.""
Finally, the Court pulled together the various prongs of
the Establishment Clause test it had begun articulating in
Schempp and Walz into a single three-prong test in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.7 In Lemon, two states, Rhode Island and Penn-
sylvania, passed legislation that would have supplemented
the pay of religious school teachers (Rhode Island) or reim-
bursed religious schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials (Pennsylvania).72 In both instances,
the statutes prohibited the state from spending tax revenues
to support religious instruction, texts, or instructional mate-
rials. Teachers in Rhode Island had to sign a statement
pledging not to teach a course in religion while receiving sal-
ary supplements.73 In Pennsylvania, the state required par-
ticipating schools to maintain financial records that demon-
strated the cost of secular education, with such records being
subject to state audit. 74
The Court struck down the statutes in both states. 5 The
67. Id. at 673.
68. Id. at 674.
69. Id. at 675.
70. WaIz, 397 U.S. at 676.
71. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
72. Id. at 606-07.
73. Id. at 608.
74. Id at 609-10.
75. See id. at 607.
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three part "Lemon test" required that "[flirst, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion."'' 6 The Court
found no violation of the secular legislative intent prong and
declined an analysis of the primary effect prong. Instead, it
moved directly to the third "excessive entanglement" prong of
the inquiry.78
In both Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, the Court
claimed that the essential mission of the sectarian schools
was instruction in religious faith.79 It also claimed that the
teachers in such schools were "under religious control and
discipline."80  These factors led the Court to conclude that
teachers "teaching in a school affiliated with his or her faith
and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience
great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral."'" In order to
be "certain" that teachers in religious schools keep the reli-
gious and secular components of education separate, the state
would be required to engage in "comprehensive, discriminat-
ing, and continuing state surveillance" of the religious insti-
tution.82 As an example of such surveillance, the Court cited
Rhode Island's requirement that the state continually deter-
mine what portion of the school's budget was directed to reli-
gious as opposed to secular education. 3 In Pennsylvania, the
statute failed not only because the state provided continuing
aid directly to the religious schools, but also because the
terms of the grant required the state to audit the financial re-
cords of the schools.84 All of these monitoring provisions led to
"excessive entanglement" between church and state, accord-
ing to the Court."
In his dissent, Justice White argued that the Court had
76. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970))
(citations omitted in original).
77. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14.
78. See id. at 614.
79. Id. at 618.
80. Id. at 617.
81. Id. at 618.
82. Id. at 619.
83. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620.
84. See id. at 621-22.
85. Id. (describing this "entanglement" as "an intimate and continuing rela-
tionship between church and state").
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created a test that imposed contradictory requirements,
which states could not pass:86
The Court thus creates an insoluble paradox for the State
and the parochial schools. The State cannot finance secu-
lar instruction if it permits religion to be taught in the
same classroom; but if it exacts a promise that religion not
be so taught-a promise the school and its teachers are
quite willing and on this record able to give-and enforces
it, it is then entangled in the 'no entanglement' aspect of
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 7
History proved Justice White's criticism trenchant. As he
suggested, Lemon created a catch-22 for states seeking to
provide aid for children attending religious schools. If states
failed to provide the "comprehensive, discriminating, and con-
tinuing state surveillance" needed to guarantee that teachers
of secular subjects were not influenced by religious beliefs,
they failed the "primary effect" prong of Lemon." If the state
did provide the requisite surveillance so that it could insure
aid was not diverted to religious purposes, it failed the "ex-
cessive entanglement" prong of Lemon.
Finally, the Court said that a "broader base of entangle-
ment" was "presented by the divisive political potential"8 9 of
both states' programs. The threat of political divisiveness fol-
lowed from the fact that partisans of different religious faiths,
as well as those that shared no faith, would fight not only
over resources, but also over whether the state should even be
engaged in funding such programs. For all of these reasons,
the Court declared both states' statutes unconstitutional on
the grounds that both involved excessive entanglement of
church and state. 90
86. See id. at 668.
87. Id.
88. The Court's "unwillingness to accept the District Court's express find-
ings that on the evidence before it none of the teachers here involved mixed re-
ligious and secular instruction" made the hurdle of the "primary effect" prong
even more difficult to address. Id at 666 (White, J., dissenting).
89. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
90. Id. at 625.
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C The Post-Lemon Cases
1. Construction Grants for Religious Colleges: Tilton v.
Richardson
In Tilton v. Richardson,9' the Court applied the Lemon
test to a case in which the federal government provided grant
funds that Catholic colleges and universities used to construct
buildings. The legislation prohibited the funds from being
used to build facilities that would be used for religious pur-
poses." The federal government also retained a twenty-year
interest in any facility constructed with the funds.9 If the col-
leges or universities violated the twenty-year restriction, the
government was "entitled to recover an amount equal to the
proportion of its present value that the federal grant bore to
the original cost of the facility." '
Applying the first prong, the Court found that the gov-
ernment had the legitimate secular objective of providing fa-
cilities for higher education."
As to the second prong, the appellant claimed that the
legislation had the primary effect of advancing religion be-
cause it freed up money for religious purposes that would
otherwise have been spent on buildings. 6 The Court ac-
knowledged that the fungibility of money inevitably meant
that the government provided some aid to religious institu-
tions, but it denied that this fact proved that the legislation's
primary effect was to advance religion. Moreover, the Court
noted that none of the colleges had violated the restrictions
that prohibited them from using the funds to build facilities
that were used for religious purposes. 8
Unlike Lemon, the Court found that religion did not
permeate "the secular education provided by church-related
colleges," and that the religious and secular educational func-
91. 403 U.S. 672 (1971). Ti/ton was actually decided on the same day as
Lemon, but I am treating it as a post-Lemon case because it was decided accord-
ing to the test established in Lemon.
92. Id. at 675.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 679.
96. See id.
97. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 681-82.
98. Id. at 680.
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tions were separable.99 This finding appeared to rest on the
fact that the colleges in question made no attempt to regulate
the content of courses, and that professors retained sole con-
trol over such content. ' ° The Court dismissed documents
that showed "certain religious restrictions on what could be
taught" because "other evidence showed that these restric-
tions were not in fact enforced and that the schools were
characterized by an atmosphere of academic freedom rather
than religious indoctrination."'0 '
The Court did find the twenty-year restriction on the use
of the funds unconstitutional, although it did not indicate on
what grounds.0 2 The Court said that the federal government
continues to retain an interest "while the building has sub-
stantive value" because they were built, in part, with federal
funds. 10 3 Finally, the Court turned to the third prong of the
Lemon test, "excessive entanglement," and again found no
constitutional violation.' The Court distinguished Tilton
from Lemon primarily on the grounds that religion was less
likely to permeate secular education at the college level than
at the grade school level.' This conclusion was based on the
Court's observation that college and university professors
were less likely to be influenced by the fact that they were
teaching at religious institutions rather than at elementary
and secondary schools."0 The Court also noted that "common
observance" supported the view that college students were
less susceptible to religious indoctrination than elementary
and secondary age school children."7 As a result, the Court
found that government aid to higher education would far less
likely support religious activities than aid to elementary and
secondary schools." 8 There was less chance of excessive en-
tanglement because the government would not have to moni-
tor the schools to make certain that the funds were not being
99. Id.
100. Id. at 681-82.
101. Id. at 681.
102. Id at 683.
103. 403 U.S. at 683.
104. Id. at 688.
105. Id. at 686-87.
106. See id. at 686.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 686.
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used to advance religion."9
2. State Funds for Maintenance, Tuition Reimbursment,
and Tax Relief Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist,'10 New York State passed legislation that provided
three kinds of financial aid programs to nonpublic elementary
and secondary schools. The first program provided direct
money grants to schools to be used for maintenance and re-
pairs of schools."' In order to qualify for this aid, schools had
to be nonpublic and nonprofit and serve a high concentration
of pupils from low-income families."2 The maintenance and
repair grants were limited to fifty percent of comparable ex-
penses in the public schools."3  The second program estab-
lished a tuition reimbursement plan for parents of children
attending nonpublic elementary and secondary schools."' To
qualify, a parent's taxable income had to be less than
$5000."' The third program was designed to give tax relief to
parents failing to qualify for tuition reimbursement."6 The
tax relief was graduated and cut off completely once the tax-
payer's earnings exceeded $25,000.' Eighty-five percent of
the students in question attended nonpublic religious schools,
practically all being Catholic schools."' The Court applied the
Lemon test to each section of the statute separately.
As to all three sections, the Court concluded that "each
measure is adequately supported by legitimate, nonsectarian
state interests."".9 Thus, none of the three types of aid vio-
lated the first prong of the Lemon test.
The Court found that the maintenance and repair section
of the statute violated the second prong of the Lemon test, as
109. Tton, 403 U.S. at 687.
110. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
111. Id. at 762.
112. Id. at 762-63.
113. Id. at 763.
114. Id. 764.
115. Id.
116. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 765.
117. Id. at 765-66.
118. Id. at 768.
119. Id. at 773.
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the funds had the primary effect of advancing religion.' The
Court noted that no controls were exercised which would have
guaranteed that the money was spent on facilities that were
used solely for nonreligious purposes."1 The Court distin-
guished this case from Everson (bus fares), Allen (lending
textbooks), and ilton (construction of buildings) on the
grounds that in all three of those cases, the secular aspect of
the activity could be separated from the religious. 2 The
Court recognized that the kind of aid provided in cases like
Everson, Allen, and Tilton "served indirectly and incidentally
to promote the religious function by rendering it more likely
that children would attend sectarian schools and by freeing
the budgets of those schools for use in other nonsecular ar-
eas."'23 But the Court argued that incidental benefits to reli-
gious schools had never been grounds for finding a statute
unconstitutional. 
2 4
The Court noted that the state might have claimed that it
could insure that the maintenance and repair funds did not
have the primary effect of advancing religion because they
were limited to fifty percent of the amount spent on compara-
ble public schools.' The apparent underlying assumption
was that sectarian schools would spend at least fifty percent
of the public school's budget on secular upkeep; thus, the
maintenance cost supported these nonreligious activities.
2 6
The Court rejected this "statistical" argument insisting that
the state had to actually demonstrate, rather than provide a
statistical guarantee, that its funds were not being used for
religious activities.
27
120. Id. at 774.
121. Id.
122. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 775.
123. Id.
124. Id at 775.
125. Id. at 777.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 776-79. The Court cited Earley v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), a
companion case to Lemon, as authority for this portion of its decision. In Ear-
ley, the Court rejected a "statistical guarantee" argument similar to that found
in Lemon. Id. at 620. There, the state of Rhode Island authorized fifteen per-
cent salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects. Id at 607. Rhode Is-
land had claimed that it was statistically true that teachers in Catholic schools
spent at least fifteen percent of their time teaching secular subjects. Id. at 607-
09. The Court rejected this argument on two grounds. See id. at 615-20. First,
it said that the state could not avoid the Establishment Clause violation by
merely assuming that its teachers could separate their religious beliefs from
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It is worth noting that the Court offered virtually no ar-
gument to support this conclusion. The Court cited Early v.
DiCenso' 28 in which it had struck down a Rhode Island law
that provided salary supplements to teachers of secular sub-
jects in religious schools on the grounds that the state could
not assume "that its teachers would succeed in segregating
'their religious beliefs from their secular educational respon-
sibilities."'129 However, the statistical argument in Nyquist
did not rely upon teachers being able to separate their reli-
gious beliefs from their secular educational functions. It
claimed, instead, that teachers spend a certain percentage of
any school day teaching nonreligious subjects that are not
subject to influence by religious beliefs.13 ° If the subject mat-
ter is not susceptible to religious interpretation, separation is
unnecessary. The Court was merely required to recognize
that teachers spend at least fifty percent of their day address-
ing nonreligious subjects. If the Court had wished to refute
this claim it might have offered some evidence that Jews,
Christians, and atheists teach geometry and algebra differ-
ently. Had the Court presented such evidence, it might also
have enlightened us as to which of these approaches was ap-
propriate for public schools where, presumably, teachers also
have beliefs about religion. Having found a violation of the
second prong of the Lemon test, the Court declined to apply
the "excessive entanglement" prong of the test.131
Turning to the tuition reimbursement section of the stat-
ute, the Court also found a violation of the "effect" test under
Lemon.'32 The state, relying on Everson (bus fare) and Allen
(textbooks), argued that because the reimbursement funds
were paid directly to parents, the "wall of separation" be-
tween church and state had been maintained.'33 The Court
acknowledged that it had considered payments to parents
rather than to the religious schools a factor in deciding Ever-
son and Allen, but it maintained that that fact alone did not
their secular educational responsibilities. Id. at 616-18. Second, it claimed that
statistical guarantees would open the door to extensive subsidies of religious
education by the state. Id. at 618-20.
128. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
129. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 778 (citing Earley, 403 U.S. at 619).
130. Id. at 779.
131. Id. at 780.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 781 n.37.
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provide per se immunity to such aid.14 Payment to parents
rather than to schools was only one of many factors to be con-
sidered in such cases.135
One of those many factors was that bus fares and text-
books, at least textbooks that addressed secular subjects,
were distinguishable on the grounds that they did not support
any religious function. Textbooks and bus fares were no dif-
ferent than police and fire protection, in that they did nothing
to further religion. 136 In the statute under review in Nyquist,
however, the Court stated that New York made no attempt to
ensure that the monies provided under the tuition grants
aided only secular education. 137 Moreover, the program was
limited to parents whose children attended private schools,
the vast majority of which were religious schools."8 This
meant that the aid was being used to further religious educa-
tion.'39 The very purpose of the tuition reimbursement plan
was to assure that economically depressed parents could af-
ford to have a sectarian school option for their children. 4'
The tuition reimbursement program therefore had the "pri-
mary effect" of advancing religion.'
Finally, the Court addressed the tax relief portion of the
New York statute. New York defended the tax relief program
on two grounds.'42 The first defense was premised upon the
argument that the state made payments directly to parents
and not to schools.4 3 The Court dismissed this defense by re-
ferring readers to its reply to the same defense in the tuition
reimbursement portion of the case."'
In its second defense, the state claimed that the tax cred-
its were no different than the tax exemptions that the Court
had previously upheld in Walz.'4' The Court rejected this
134. Id. at 781.
135. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 781.
136. Id. at 781-82.
137. Id. at 784.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 789.
140. See id.
141. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 785. The Court also said that it was important
that in Allen and Everson the aid was offered to all schoolchildren whether they
were in public or private schools. Id. at 782 n.38.
142. Id. at 793.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 790-91.
145. Id. at 791.
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claim on several grounds, arguing that the tax exemption
granted to church property in Walz had a long history of ac-
ceptance by all fifty states and Congress, whereas the tax
credits offered to parents in Nyquist had only recently been
enacted. "6 The reasoning underlying the long history of tax
exemptions for church property was more important. Accord-
ing to the Court, tax policy had been used as a means of reli-
gious oppression,1 "' and tax exemptions for church property
were merely evidence of the state's attempt to remain neutral
with respect to religious issues. The Court stated that "spe-
cial tax benefits" did not comply with the principle of neutral-
ity, since they "aid and advance" religion, violating the second
prong of Lemon."'4 As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his
dissent on behalf of three members of the Court, this anoma-
lous decision would have us believe that tax exemptions pro-
vided directly to churches do less to advance religion than do
tax credits to parents who send their children (largely in
search of secular education) to religious schools.'49
3. Textbooks, Instructional Materials and Equipment:
Meek v. Pittenger
In Meek v. Pittenger,'50 the state of Pennsylvania was
sued for enacting two acts that provided aid to religious
schools. The first of these two statutes, Act 195, provided
such schools with textbooks, instructional materials, and
equipment (projectors, maps movies, charts, etc.)."" Review-
ing the portion of Act 195 that provided for the loan of text-
books, the Court found the statute constitutional,'152 relying
upon its earlier decisions in Everson 5 3 and Allen.54  As in
Everson and Allen, the Court said that states were not pro-
hibited from spending tax funds to provide certain services
such as bus fare (Everson) or textbooks (Allen), provided they
did so as part of a general program that pays for all students,
146. Id. at 792.
147. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 793-94.
148. Id. at 793.
149. Id. at 808 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
150. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
151. Id. at 353-55.
152. Id. 362.
153. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
154. 392 U.S. 235 (1968).
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whether in public or private school.'55 As in Allen, the Court
stressed that the Pennsylvania statute loaned books directly
to students and their parents rather than to parochial
schools, so that the financial benefit was to parents, not to
schools. Again, as in Allen, the Court conceded that when the
state provides free textbooks to children attending religious
schools, such children become more likely to attend parochial
schools, but it denied that this fact alone was sufficient to
render the statute unconstitutional. 156
Turning to the portion of Act 195 that loaned instruc-
tional material and equipment directly to religious schools,
the Court declared the law unconstitutional."' Applying the
first prong of the Lemon test, the Court found no problem
with the state's secular legislative purpose."8  The Court
agreed that, in providing instructional material to students,
the state was merely attempting to assure "ample opportu-
nity to develop their intellectual capacities."" 9
Applying the second prong of Lemon, the Court found
that, because the state loaned instructional materials directly
to religious schools, the materials had the "unconstitutional
primary effect of advancing religion.""6  The Court pointed
out that seventy-five percent of the schools that received the
aid under the program were "church-related or religiously af-
filiated."16' The Court acknowledged that a state may, as part
of general legislation, include "church-related schools in pro-
grams providing bus transportation, school lunches, and pub-
lic health facilities."' 62 The state could provide such services
to religious institutions because the services were "secular
and nonideological" and "unrelated to the primary, religious-
oriented educational function of the sectarian school.' 63
Moreover, according to the Court, the benefits of such services
were "indirect and incidental."'1
155. Meek, 421 U.S. at 359-60.
156. Id. at 360.
157. Id. at 363 ("But we agree with the appellants that the direct loan of in-
structional material and equipment has the unconstitutional primary effect of










In contrast, the Court claimed that the "massive aid"
provided for by the instructional aid program was "neither
indirect nor incidental."6 ' This conclusion was premised upon
the fact that Pennsylvania authorized just under $12 million
of direct aid in the form of instructional materials' which
"flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a
substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the reli-
gious mission.""' The Court came to this conclusion despite
acknowledging that "the material and equipment that are the
subjects of the loan-maps, charts, and laboratory equipment,
for example-are 'self-polic[ing], in that starting as secular,
nonideological and neutral, they will not change in use."1
68
Given the size of the loans, and the fact that they were made
directly to religious schools, the Court concluded that the in-
structional aid could not be limited to the secular functions of
the schools without supporting the religious functions.'69 The
Court therefore concluded that the aid had the effect of ad-
vancing religion.' 0
The Court insisted that the $12 million in aid, coupled
with the religious nature of the schools into which it was
channeled, made the instructional materials portion of the
statute unconstitutional. 7 ' This conclusion cannot be squared
with the textbook portion of the case. Because the state spent
$4,670,000 on the textbooks it loaned the schools, Justice
Brennan's dissent (with respect to the textbook portion of the
decision) correctly charges the plurality with failing to "ex-
plain how the [cost] factor weighs determinatively against the
validity of the instructional materials loan provisions, and not
also against the validity of the textbook loan provisions.'7 2
Contrary to the Court's apparent assumption, nothing about
the Establishment Clause indicates that the founders in-
tended to set a dollar amount that would trigger the provi-
165. Id. at 350.
166. Id.
167. Meek, 421 U.S. at 366 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743
(1973)).
168. Id. at 365 (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 660 (E.D. Pa.
1974)).
169. Id. at 365-66.
170. See id. (citing Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743).
171. See id.
172. Id. at 378.
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sion. 173
Nor was there any conceivable distinction between the
textbooks and instructional materials in terms of the Court's
ability to "separate secular educational functions from the
predominantly religious role performed by ... church-related
elementary and secondary schools."'74 If textbooks are not
converted to a religious purpose merely because they are de-
livered to schools in which religion is so ubiquitous that a
significant percentage of its function is subsumed in the reli-
gious mission, then certainly neither are instructional mate-
rials. The Court conceded this idea when it acknowledged
that instructional materials "are self polic[ing], in that start-
ing as secular, nonideological and neutral, they will not
,,175
change in use.
Because instructional aid was provided directly to reli-
gious schools, this case, at first glance, logically appears dis-
tinguishable from Everson and Allen. Justice Rehnquist's
dissent casts serious doubt upon this assertion. Rehnquist
argued:
[T]he fact that the school is the bailee [cannot] be re-
garded as constitutionally determinative. In the textbook
loan program upheld in Allen, supra, the private schools
were responsible for transmitting the book requests to the
Board of Education and were permitted to store the loaned
books on their premises. I fail to see how the instructional
materials and equipment program can be distinguished in
any significant respect. Under both programs "ownership
remains, at least technically, in the State."76
Moreover, the Court did not appear to premise its conclu-
sion upon this distinction, focusing instead on the amount of
the aid and the religious nature of the schools that received
the aid. But neither of these elements were distinguishable
from the textbook issue. The Court left states in an anoma-
lous position-able constitutionally to provide religious
schools with maps printed within books but unable to provide
173. Madison in his Memorial and Remonstrance, a paper that the Court of-
ten considers when seeking to interpret the Establishment Clause, suggested
that forcing a "citizen to contribute a three pence of his property" would violate
the principle of anti-establishment. See Madison, supra note 35, at 300.
174. Meek, 421 U.S. at 365.
175. Id. at 366 (quoting Meek, 374 F. Supp. at 660).
176. Id. at 391 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)) (cita-
tions omitted in original).
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maps which pulled down in front of blackboards.1 77
Next, the Court considered Act 194, which authorized the
state to supply professional staff that provided auxiliary ser-
vices (remedial and accelerated instruction, guidance counsel-
ing and testing, speech, and hearing services) directly to non-
public school children. 178 The Court noted that "the services
[were] provided only on the nonpublic school premises, and
only when 'requested by nonpublic school representatives.'
1 79
The Court conceded the right of the state "to make free auxil-
iary services available to all students in the Commonwealth,
including those who attend church-related schools."8' The is-
sue was merely whether such services could be provided on
the religious school's grounds. 8'
Once again, the Court did not question the state's secular
legislative purpose or the primary effect of the Act, thus obvi-
ating the need to apply the first and second prongs of the
Lemon test. 82 The Court, however, did find a violation of the
third prong of Lemon.'
83
The Court rejected the district court's finding that "no
continuing supervision of the personnel providing auxiliary
services would be necessary to establish that Act 194's secu-
lar limitations were observed" or to ensure that a teacher did
not "'succumb to sectarianization of his or her professional
work."" 4 Citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court argued that
the state could not rely upon the professionalism of teachers
to ensure they did not succumb to the desire to "inculcate re-
ligion."'85  Instead the Court held that the state would be
forced to maintain "a comprehensive, discriminating, and con-
tinuing state surveillance" to ensure that the First Amend-
ment was respected.'86 However, the Court argued that if the
state were to do so, it would violate the third prong of the
Lemon test, which required the state to avoid "excessive en-
177. See id. at 389-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 367.
179. Id. (citing Dep't of Ed., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Guidelines for
Administration of Acts 194 and 195 § 13).
180. Meek, 421 U.S. at 368 n.17.
181. See id. at 368.
182. Id. at 367-68.
183. See id. at 372.
184. Id. (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1974)).
185. Id. at 369.
186. Meek, 421 U.S. at 370 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-
19 (1971)).
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tanglements" between church and state.187
Lemon presented a significantly different set of facts,
however, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent.' 8 In
Lemon, the state attempted to supplement the salaries of
teachers who were employed by the religious schools.8 9
There, the Court had specifically emphasized that, by virtue
of the fact that religious schools employed them, the teachers
were under "religious control and discipline."190 In Meek, the
state employed the teachers, and their only connection to the
religious school was that they went there to assist children.' 9'
In addition, Act 194 specifically limited the substantive areas
that the public school officials could address to those that "are
presently or hereafter provided for in public school[s]." 19" The
district court's evidentiary record clarified that this restric-
tion had been fully observed. 9'
As Justice White had predicted in his dissent in Lemon,
the "primary effect" and "excessive entanglement" prongs of
Lemon were combining to become tests that its takers could
only fail.9 When Pennsylvania provided language in the
statute that merely limited the instructional materials to "the
subjects and activities prescribed by the standards of the
State Board of Education,"19 without providing some monitor-
ing provision that guaranteed the aid would not advance re-
ligion, it failed the primary effect test. And, when the state
included the monitoring provisions necessary to guarantee
that professional staff and auxiliary services did not have the
"primary effect of advancing religion," it failed the "excessive
entanglement" test. Not surprisingly, Justice Rehnquist
questioned whether the possibility of meeting the entangle-
ment test was now anything more than "a promise to the ear
to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent
bequest in a pauper's will."' '96
187. Id.
188. Id. at 393 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
189. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617.
190. Id.
191. Meek, 421 U.S. at 352-53.
192. Id. at 393 (quoting Act 194, § 1(b)).
193. Id. at 368-69, 392 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
194. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 668.
195. Meek, 421 U.S. at 363.




4. Tax Deductions for School Expenses: Mueller v. Allen
In Mueller v. Allen,197 the Court began to consider allow-
ing states to increase their level of support, pursuant to gen-
eral welfare programs, for children attending religious
schools.' 9 In Mueller, the Court was asked to decide whether
the state of Minnesota could constitutionally allow taxpayers
whose children attended religious schools to deduct expenses
associated with such education (regular, summer, and reme-
dial tuition, cost of various types of rental equipment, pencils,
and notebooks, etc.).199
In applying the first "secular legislative purpose" prong of
Lemon, the Court found no constitutional problem with the
statute.200 The state's interest in educating its children, the
significant reduction in cost to the state for children attend-
ing religious schools, and the "wholesome competition" that
private schools generated for public schools all provided the
state with sufficient secular purpose.2'
The more difficult challenge for the legislation was the
second prong, the "primary effect" test. The Court found
three reasons why the tax deduction did not have the "pri-
mary effect" of advancing religion. First, the education ex-
pense deduction was only one of many deductions available
under the statute.0 2 Additional deductions were available for
medical expenses and charitable contributions. 20 3 The Court
inferred that the broad range of deductions indicated that
Minnesota had not singled out parents of children attending
religious schools for special treatment.2 4 Moreover, the Court
claimed that states were entitled to "substantial deference"
when deciding how to equalize tax burdens among its citi-
205
zens.
197. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
198. Id.
199. See id. at 391.
200. Id. at 394-95.
201. Id. at 395.
202. Id. at 396.
203. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396.
204. Although the Court does not cite Lemon, it seems to suggest that the
wide range of deductions ensured that Minnesota avoided the problem Pennsyl-
vania faced when it "singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic
benefit." Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973).
205. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396. The Court distinguished this case from Ny-
quist on the grounds that the Nyquist Court had "expressed considerable doubt"
that the tax benefits in that case "could be regarded as part of a genuine system
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Second, the Court argued that it was a "material consid-
eration" that any benefit that might result to the parochial
schools resulted from the "numerous private choices of indi-
vidual parents," rather than from direct assistance to the
schools."' This reasoning signified that no "imprimatur of
state approval" had been "conferred on any particular relig-
ion, or on religion generally."" 7 The Court further said, "[t]he
historic purposes of the Clause simply do not encompass the
sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by
the private choices of individual parents, that eventually
flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available tax
benefit at issue in this case."0 8
Third, the Court argued that the availability of the de-
ductions to all parents, including those whose children at-
tended public and nonsectarian private schools, indicated "an
important index of secular effect.""2 9 The Court took pains to
distinguish Mueller from Nyquist in this respect. In Nyquist,
New York provided tuition deductions for a limited class of
individuals whose children attended private schools.210 In
Mueller, deductions were available for parents of children at-
tending both private and public schools.21 ' The Court argued
that the Minnesota legislation was akin to Allen and Everson
in that the aid was part of a program that benefited "a broad
spectrum of citizens."2
In response to this third argument, appellants claimed
that the Court ought to ignore the facial neutrality of the
statute because, at least with respect to the tuition deduction,
the statute primarily benefited parents of children in reli-
gious schools. 23 The Court swept aside such statistical evi-
dence on the grounds that it failed to "provide the certainty
that this field stands in need of."214 The Court stated, "[w]e
would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality
of tax laws." Id. at 396 n.6. Most of the tax benefits in Nyquist were better un-
derstood as mere tuition grants according to the Court.
206. Id. at 399.
207. See id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 236, 274 (1981)).
208. Id. at 400.
209. Id. at 397 (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274).
210. See id. at 398.
211. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398.
212. Id. at 397 (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274).
213. Id. at 400.
214. Id. at 401.
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of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent
to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits
under the law."2 5 Such an approach makes sense, since noth-
ing about the First Amendment suggests that its application
varies depending upon this sort of statistical argument. The
appellant's approach would force the Court to decide that the
First Amendment was violated only when some arbitrary per-
centage of participants took deductions for sectarian tuition.
The Court also argued that there was evidence that some
public school parents were able to take advantage of the tui-
tion deduction and all public school parents were able to take
deductions for other items under the statute.216
Finally, in response to the appellants' disparate impact
argument, the Court argued, "whatever unequal effect may be
attributed to the statutory classification can fairly be re-
garded as a rough return for the [savings] ... provided to the
State and all taxpayers by parents sending-their children to
parochial schools." '1
Turning to the third prong of Lemon, the Court claimed it
had "no difficulty in concluding that the Minnesota statute
does not 'excessively entangle' the state in religion."21 The
Court found no evidence that the state would be required to
maintain "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing
state surveillance" to insure that the tax deduction statute
did not violate the Establishment Clause. 219 The only possible
monitoring requirement would be to insure that the textbooks
for which parents took deductions were limited to secular
purposes. The Court claimed that the situation here did not
differ substantially from Allen, where the state had an ongo-
ing duty to monitor whether the textbooks loaned to students
attending religious schools were limited to secular use.2 2 0
As to the "political divisiveness" variation of the "exces-
sive entanglement" prong, the Court cut short any discussion
of the test by holding that the issue only arose in cases
215. Id.
216. Id. at 401 n.9. The Court also stated that parents of public school chil-
dren were able to take advantage of the deductions for things like summer
school programs, private tutoring, and schools supplies, all of which were de-
ductible items under the statute. Id. at 391 n.2.
217. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 402.
218. Id. at 403.
219. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
220. See id.
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"where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools
or to teachers in parochial schools."22'
Justice Marshall's dissent, on behalf of Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens, argued that the deductions had the
"primary effect" of advancing religion.222 This conclusion fol-
lowed from the fact that the overwhelming majority of par-
ents who took the deduction had children in sectarian
schools.223 He argued that the majority had erred in claiming
that taking such "statistical evidence" into account would
lead to constitutional uncertainty.22 4 In the dissent's view,
"The only factual inquiry necessary is the same as that em-
ployed in Nyquist and Sloan v. Lemon: whether the deduction
permitted for tuition expenses primarily benefits those who
send their children to religious schools."225
Just how the dissent would define "primarily" was un-
clear. Marshall did not indicate what percentage of children
needed to attend public schools in order for such a deduction
to be found constitutional. Nor did he cite any evidence to
support the claim that the Establishment Clause was in-
tended to turn on such an inquiry. The dissenters provided
some portent of how they would define the term "primarily"
when they indicated that they were prepared to overturn Al-
len. Marshall claimed that the Court, in deciding Allen, had
[B]elieved at that time that it lacked sufficient experience
to determine "based solely on judicial notice" that "the
process of secular and religious training are so intertwined
that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public
[will always be] instrumental in the teaching of religion."
This basis for distinguishing secular instructional materi-
als and secular textbooks is simply untenable, and is in-
consistent with many of our more recent decisions con-
226cerning state aid to parochial schools.
The decision in Allen was premised on the fact that the
loan of textbooks to children attending religious schools was
part of a general program in which books were loaned to all
children in the state regardless of whether they attended pub-
221. Id. at 403 n.11.
222. Id. 409 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
223. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 410-11.
224. Id. at 409 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 409-10.
226. Id. at 415.
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lic or religious schools.227 There can be little doubt that in
1968, the overwhelming majority of students in New York
were attending public schools. Hence, the benefit of the text-
book loan program fell "primarily" to parents of students at-
tending public schools. Nonetheless, even in that situation
the dissenters indicated they now found a violation of the
"primary effect" test.28 The "primarily" threshold evidently
meant (in the view of the dissenters) that no aid whatsoever
could find its way to religious schools regardless of how inci-
dental or de minimis it was.
5. Public Teachers in Religious Schools: Grand Rapids v.
Ball andAguilar v. Felton
In Grand Rapids v. Ball29 and Aguilar v. Felton,3 ' the
Court revisited the issues raised in Meek v. Pittenger.231 In
Ball, Michigan adopted two programs (Shared Time and
Community Education) that offered educational programs to
students in private sectarian and nonsectarian schools.2
Ball's Shared Time program offered remedial and enrichment
classes in mathematics, reading, art, music, and physical
education.233 Teachers in the Shared Time program were full-
time public school employees who went to religious schools to
teach the remedial and enrichment classes.234
The Community Education program, available on the
grounds of religious schools, offered classes in arts and crafts,
home economics, Spanish, gymnastics, yearbook production,
Christmas arts and crafts, drama, newspaper, humanities,
chess, model building, and nature appreciation.235 Although
hired as public employees for the limited purposes of the
Community Education program, virtually all teachers in the
program were "otherwise employed full time by the same" re-
ligious school in which they taught. 36
227. See id.
228. Id. at 414-15.
229. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
230. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
231. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
232. Ball, 473 U.S. at 375.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 375-76.
235. Id. at 376-77.
236. Id. at 377 (quoting Ars. United for Separation Between Church & State
v. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids, 546 F. Supp. 1071, 1079 (W.D. Mich. 1982)).
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Similarly, in Aguilar, New York was using federal funds
to pay public school employees to teach and provide guidance
counseling in parochial schools.237 The state targeted the pro-
gram to poor children in low-income neighborhoods and in-
cluded remedial reading, reading skills, remedial mathemat-
ics, English as a second language, and guidance services."'
The one major difference between Aguilar and Ball was that
New York provided a monitoring mechanism to ensure that
teachers did not indoctrinate students with religious beliefs.239
To that end, New York provided for "occasional unannounced
supervisory visits" by supervisors of the program."'
With respect to the programs in Ball, the Court found
three violations of the "primary effect test., 24 1 Relying upon
Meek v. Pittenger,2 2 the Court found first that teachers "in-
fluenced by the pervasively sectarian nature of the religious
schools in which they work, may subtly or overtly indoctri-
nate the students in particular religious tenets at public ex-
pense."243 Second, the Court said that having public teachers
in sectarian schools created a "symbolic union of church and
state ... [that] threatens to convey a message of state support
for religion to students and to the general public."2" Third,
the Court found that the programs support sectarian schools
by relieving them of the duty they otherwise had to teach
secular subjects.245
In Aguilar, the Court insisted that the supervisory sys-
tem established to insure that teachers did not indoctrinate
students in religion resulted in "excessive entanglement" in
violation of the third prong of Lemon."' The Court also found
two-additional grounds for a violation of the "excessive entan-
glement" prong of Lemon.17 In the first instance, the Court
found that the "administrative cooperation" required to im-
plement the program "entangles church and state in still an-
237. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 404-06 (1985).
238. Id. at 406.
239. Id. at 409.
240. Id. at 407.
241. Bal, 473 U.S. at 397.
242. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
243. Ball, 473 U.S. at 397.
244. Id
245. Id.
246. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409.
247. See id. at 413-14.
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other way that infringes interests at the heart of the Estab-
lishment Clause."'2 4 Second, the Court argued that the "nu-
merous judgments that must be made by agents of the city
[concerning] matters that may be subtle and controversial
[and] ... of deep religious significance" would foster "political
divisiveness along religious lines. 249
Combined, these decisions meant that in order to provide
remedial and enrichment programs to students in religious
schools, the state could no longer use the less expensive and
less complicated method of moving a few teachers to sectarian
schools. Instead, the state had to undertake the expense, and
additional administrative headache, of bussing a much larger
number of religious school students to public schools.2 °
Once again, what Justice Rehnquist called the "'Catch-22'
paradox" of the "primary effects/excessive entanglement"
prongs of Lemon reared its ugly head.25' When, as in Ball, the
state attempted to meet the needs of students by supplying
teachers to provide remedial or enriched educational experi-
ences, the Court raised the specter of teachers indoctrinating
students into the faith.25 2 As a result, the state failed the "pri-
mary effect" test, despite the Court's acknowledgement that
there was no actual evidence of such indoctrination in the
many years of the program's existence.5 3 If, by providing a
monitoring system as in Aguilar, the state attempted to
guarantee no indoctrination occurred, it would fail the "exces-
sive entanglement" test.
6. Vocational Rehabilitation Funds for Handicapped
Students Attending Christian Colleges: Witters v.
Washington
In Witters v. Washington, 4 the Court agreed that the
Establishment Clause did not prevent the state of Washing-
ton from providing vocational rehabilitation funds that were
then used by a blind student to pay for theological studies at
248. Id. at 413.
249. Id. at 414.
250. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 213 (1997) (documenting the addi-
tional expense involved in bussing a large number of religious school students to
public schools).
251. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420.
252. Ball, 473 U.S. at 389.
253. Id. at 388.
254. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
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a Christian college.255 In a rare instance of unity in judgment,
but not reasoning, all nine Justices agreed that such aid did
not have the "primary effect" of advancing religion.256
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall pointed to several
key factors that led to the Court's decision. Marshall began
by noting that any state aid that ended up in the hands of a
religious institution did so because of the "genuinely inde-
pendent and private" choices of individual recipients.
25 7
Moreover, the program provided aid to recipients without re-
gard to the religious-secular standing of the institution that
ultimately received the funds.5 Nor, according to Marshall,
did the program provide any incentives that encouraged the
recipients to choose a religious institution.255  Finally, there
was no evidence to suggest "that any other person has ever
sought to finance religious education or activity" through the
program. 2' Given these facts, the Court concluded that the
program could not reasonably be viewed as state sponsorship
or endorsement of religion.261
Three separate concurring opinions by Justices White,
Powell (joined by Burger and Rehnquist), and O'Connor all
appear to agree that the precedent set down in Mueller
should have guided the decision in this case.262 Powell's con-
255. Id. at 483.
256. Id. at 489.
257. Id. at 487.
258. Id. at 487-88.
259. Id. at 488.
260. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
261. Id. at 488-89. The Court said that all parties agreed that Washington
State had a "secular purpose" in creating the program. Id. at 485. In addition,
the Court declined to address the "entanglement" issue because there had been
no decision on this issue by the district court. Id. at 486 n.3. The opinion did
invite the lower courts to take up the "entanglement" issue. Id. Therefore, at
least for the time being, the state did not run afoul of the first and third prongs
of Lemon. Id. at 486, 489 n.3.
262. Given the apparent agreement among all five Justices that this case
should have been decided according to the principle set down in Mueller, it is
not clear why none of these five wrote the opinion of the Court. In all three con-
curring opinions each Justice carefully articulates his or her agreement with
the other concurring opinions. Moreover, no concurring author cites any differ-
ences with the other concurring authors, with the exception of Justice White
who, while not disagreeing with Justice Powell, did express some apparent res-
ervation when he wrote that he agreed with "most" of what Justice Powell wrote
"with respect to the relevance of Mueller v. Allen." Id. at 490. Perhaps Justice
White's small measure of qualification explains why these five Justices did not
form a majority, but even that reasoning is not clear since Justice White did not
explain why he agreed with only "most" of what Powell wrote.
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currence, for instance, argues that Mueller explicitly provides
that state programs which are "neutral in offering [aid] to a
class defined without reference to religion do not violate the
second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, because any aid
to religion results from the private choices of individual bene-
ficiaries. '26' Powell argued that under Mueller, the fact that
the petitioner was the only individual to attempt to use the
state assistance to pay for tuition at a religious college is ir-
relevant.2" According to Powell, Mueller held that the state
could pass aid along to religious institutions provided that
two conditions are met. First, the state must make the aid
available to everyone in the class regardless of religious af-
filiation.26 Second, any aid that ends up in the hands of reli-
gious institutions must do so as a result of the genuine
choices of individuals who have not been pressured or influ-
enced by the state.266
7 Sign Language Interpreter in Religious High School:
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
The next significant public funding of private sectarian
educational case, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dis-
trict,67 also involved a disabled petitioner. James Zobrest,
who was deaf, sued to force a public school district to provide
him with a sign-language interpreter to accompany him to a
Catholic high school." The school district denied him the in-
terpreter on the grounds that such aid would violate the Es-
tablishment Clause.266 Both the district and appellate courts
agreed with the school district.27°
The Supreme Court reversed, continuing its recent trend
of allowing state aid that is allocated in a religiously neutral
manner to flow through parents to religious schools. The
Court premised its holding and analysis on Mueller and Wit-
ters, both of which required the benefits of a state program to
263. Id. at 491 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)); see also id. at
493 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing the same language from Lemon that Jus-
tice Powell cited in his concurrence).
264. Id. at 492.
265. Id. at 491.
266. Witters, 474 U.S. at 491.
267. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
268. Id. at 4.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 4-5.
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be available to all parents within the class regardless of
whether their children attend public/secular, private/secular,
or private/sectarian schools.17 ' This requirement emphasized
the neutrality issue, in that it forced the state to show no
preference for religion. The Mueller Court also required that
whatever aid found its way to religious schools had to do so as
a result of "private decisions of individual parents," without
272
any incentive to choose sectarian education.
The school district claimed that the Court should distin-
guish Zobrest from Mueller and Witters because the aid re-
quested would require a "public employee [to be] physically
present in a sectarian school."2 73 The school district argued
that the facts of Zobrest more closely resembled those of Meek
and Ball. 1 4 The Court said this argument failed for two rea-
sons. In the first instance, the type of programs in Meek
(teaching material and equipment) and Ball (teachers, in-
structional material, and equipment) "relieved sectarian
schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in educating
their students." '76 In contrast, the school district in Zobrest
was not "relieved of an expense that it otherwise would have
assumed in educating its students."
2 7
According to the Court, the second distinction was that
the sign language interpreter, unlike the teachers or equip-
ment in Meek and Ball, "will neither add to nor subtract
from" the educational process. 8 In making this point, the
Court stated that "the Establishment Clause lays down no
absolute bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian
school."2 79 The Court argued that "[s]uch a flat rule, smacking
of antiquated notions of 'taint,' would indeed exalt form over
substance."28 ° For the first time, the Court appeared willing
to accept that religion was not a disease that public employ-
ees automatically caught by virtue of walking into sectarian
schools.
271. Id. at 8-9.
272. Id. at 10.
273. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 11.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 12.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 13.




Unfortunately, the Court did not spell out the signifi-
cance of the second distinction. The Court appeared to as-
sume that if interpreters faithfully interpret exactly what the
religious schoolteacher says in class, and do not add anything
to what is already present in the classroom, they could not be
said to actively contribute to the indoctrination of religious
beliefs. 281  Three members of the dissent clearly believed in
this interpretation of the majority opinion.8 2 The dissenters
argued that the Establishment Clause absolutely prohibits
government involvement in "indoctrination" of religious be-
liefs. 283  This prohibition included interpreters provided at
state expense in religious schools, because the Establishment
Clause "always proscribed the provision of benefits that af-
ford even the 'opportunity for the transmission of sectarian
views. ,,2s
8. Public School Teachers Revisited. Agostini v. Felton
In Agostini v. Felton,285 the petitioners, the New York
City School Board, sought relief from the remedy imposed by
the Court's earlier decision in Aguilar .2 " The underlying pro-
gram and legal issues were the same in both cases. New York
City wished to use federal Title I funds to provide "remedial
education, guidance, and job counseling" to students in low
income areas who were at risk of failing to perform up to
state standards.87 Aguilar had declared unconstitutional
New York's attempt to provide such services by placing public
school teachers in religious schools.88 In Agostini, the New
York City School Board asked the Court to allow it to resume
this practice.2 9
According to the school board, cost considerations moti-
281. See id.
282. Justice O'Connor, the fourth member of the dissent, did not join the oth-
ers on this point.
283. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 21.
284. Id. (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977)). All four of the
dissenters would have refused to hear the case on the grounds that rendering a
decision on the constitutionality of the school district's actions was not unavoid-
able. See id. at 14-17.
285. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
286. Id. at 208-09.
287. Id. at 209.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 208.
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vated its request for relief.29° The Court noted that there had
been no dispute that Aguilar had imposed "significant" addi-
tional cost.291 The Court cited evidence that as a result of
Aguilarthe school board had incurred an additional $100 mil-
lion cost to supply the same services.292 The additional ex-
penses were attributed to "computer-aided instruction, leas-
ing sites and mobile instructional units, and transporting
students to those sites."293 Moreover, the federal regulations
specified that the additional costs imposed by Aguilar were to
be deducted from Title I funds, and that any other state or
federal funds could not cover them.294 The cost of complying
with Aguilar meant a dollar for dollar reduction in services
offered to economically underprivileged at-risk students un-
der Title I.
The issue turned on whether subsequent decisions had
rendered Aguilar, and its companion case Ball, "no longer
good law., 299 The Court reiterated the three assumptions jus-
tifying its conclusion in Ball, which held that placing public
employees in religious schools had the "impermissible effect of
advancing religion."296 First, when public employees provide
services on the grounds of religious schools, they aid in the
inculcation of religion.297 Second, when public employees
work in sectarian schools, a symbolic union is created be-
298 "tween church and state. Third, "any and all public aid that
directly aids the educational function of religious schools
impermissibly finances religious indoctrination, even if the
aid reaches such schools as a consequence of private deci-
sionmaking.,
299
290. Id. at 213-14.




295. Id. at 209.
296. Id. at 222.
297. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222.
298. Id.
299. Id. The Court's summation of these three assumptions differs from the
court's summation of issues in Ball, principally with respect to the third as-
sumption related to decision making. In Ball, the Court stated that the third
reason for finding the program promoted religion was that "the programs in ef-
fect subsidize the religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a
substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects." Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985). The resulting difference was critical,
according to the dissent. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 247 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The Court then addressed each of these assumptions in
light of the petitioner's claims that more recent decisions had
undermined Ball and Aguiar.311 In response to the first as-
sumption, the Court, citing Zobrest, argued that it had
"abandoned the presumption erected in. .. Ball that the
placement of public employees on parochial school grounds
inevitably result[ed] in the impermissible effect of state-
sponsored indoctrination or constitutes symbolic union be-
tween government and religion.""'
The dissent argued that Zobrest could not be cited as
authority for such a conclusion.0 2 In the dissent's view, Zo-
brest was limited to those few situations where the public
employee role was so "circumscribed" that the individual
could not possibly add any religious content to the class-
room."3 The sign language interpreter in Zobrest had been
nothing more than a "hearing aid," according to the dissent,
and thereby incapable of aiding in the indoctrination of relig-
ion.3°
In response, the majority argued that Zobrest had not re-
lied upon the assumption that a sign language interpreter
had no opportunity to inject religious content.0 5 Had the Zo-
brest Court made such an assumption, it would not have
bothered to examine the record for evidence that the signer
had violated his or her professional duty by adding such reli-
gious content °.
In fairness to the dissent, it must be noted that the Zo-
brest majority did go out of its way to argue that a profes-
sional oath forbidding interpreters from adding or subtracting
from the message that he or she relayed constrained the
signer.37 The Court might instead have acknowledged that it
When, as in Ball or Agostini, the publicly supported programs relieved the paro-
chial schools of a substantial portion of their educational burden, they result in
"direct and substantial" aid to religion, which is a violation of the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 252.
300. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222.
301. Id. at 223.
302. Id. at 248 (Souter, J., dissenting).
303. Id. at 248-49 (Souter, J., dissenting).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 224-25.
306. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225.
307. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion argued that "the task of a sign-
language interpreter seems to us quite different from that of a teacher or a
guidance counselor .... The sign-language interpreter they have requested will
2004 739
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was expanding upon the principle established in Zobrest.38
Either way, a majority of the Court had apparently been wait-
ing for an opportunity to overrule the decisions in Aguilar and
Ball.309
The Court likewise rejected Ball's second assumption
that the presence of public employees on religious school
grounds creates an impression of "symbolic union" between
church and state.30  The majority noted that many lower
court decisions upheld the provision of Title I services in mo-
bile units located just off religious school grounds.31' Accord-
ing to the Court, these decisions implicitly suggested that the
symbolic union disappears once the teacher walks from the
classroom to the mobile unit parked outside."2 This majority
went on to point out that such analysis reduces the constitu-
tional question to one of mere location, the "degree of coopera-
tion between Title I instructors and parochial school faculty is
the same no matter where the services are provided."3 3 Rest-
ing the finding of "symbolic union" on location alone was "nei-
neither add to nor subtract from that environment, and hence the provision of
such assistance is not barred by the Establishment Clause." Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993).
308. Such an approach would have presented procedural problems for the
majority inasmuch as Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pursu-
ant to which the appeal in Agostimi had been made, did not allow the Court to
relitigate the claims underlying the original judgment in Aguilar. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 60(b)(5). Rule 60(b)(5) does, however, allow a court to relieve a party
from the conditions of a previous judgment when "it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have a prospective application." Id. In order to grant "eq-
uitable" relief under Rule 60(b), the majority was forced to argue that the origi-
nal judgment in Aguilar had already been so undermined as to make the con-
tinued enforcement of the judgment inequitable. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 217-18.
That argument required the majority to argue that Zobrest had already ac-
knowledged that an interpreter could inject content into the interpretation,
something the Court had not actually done in Zobrest. Id. at 225. The majority
obviously recognized the problem it confronted with Rule 60(b), but nonetheless
concluded that a great inequity would result if it required the school board to
continue incurring the millions in additional cost required by Aguilar while it
waited for the Court to get around to doing in a latter case what it was clearly
prepared to do immediately. Id. at 240.
309. Five Justices had expressed the view that Aguilar should be reconsid-
ered as early as 1994 in Bd. of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687 (1994).





ther 'sensible' nor 'sound."'3 4
As to the third assumption, the Court claimed that its
decisions in Witters and Zobrest had undermined the holding
in Ball that all aid which supports religion violates the second
prong of Lemon, the "primary effect" test. 3 5 Witters, for in-
stance, allowed the state to provide a vocational tuition grant
to a blind student with full knowledge that the student would
use the money to attend a Christian college.1 6 The key fact in
Witters and Zobrest had been that the state had distributed
the funds in a manner that was neutral with respect to relig-
ion. In both cases, the state had not taken notice, one way or
the other, of whether the institution that ultimately received
the funds was sectarian or nonsectarian. This scenario was
no different than the state issuing a paycheck to a state em-
ployee knowing that the individual intended to contribute
some of the proceeds to a church.31 '7 According to the Court,
this same neutrality applied in Agostini because the state
dispensed Title I aid to students without regard to the reli-
gious nature of the school they chose to attend.3 8
The dissent argued that the manner in which the state
distributed the aid in Agostini vitiated its neutrality because
it was paid "directly to the religious school[]."319 Moreover,
the dissent implied that because the state distributed Title I
funds without requiring individual students to apply, these
distributions did not result from private decision-making of
individual parents, as had been the case in Zobrest and Wit-
terS. 
320
The majority rejected these contentions on several
grounds. In the first instance the majority pointed out that,
contrary to the dissent's claim, none of the funds were paid
"directly to the religious schools."321 Instead federal Title I
funds passed through the hands of the school board and went
directly to public agencies who provided services to stu-
dents. 22 For that reason none of the funds ever reached the
314. Id. at 227-28.
315. Id. at 225.
316. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225.
317. Id. at 226.
318. Id. at 229.
319. Id. at 252.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 228.
322. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228.
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"coffers of the religious schools" directly or indirectly. 323 The
majority also rejected the claim that providing Title I services
directly to students, without requiring them to first fill out an
application, increased the state's financing of religious indoc-
trination.24 The majority noted that the level of financial
support for religious indoctrination neither increased nor de-
creased depending upon whether a student fills out an appli-
cation prior to receiving the Title I services. 25
The majority opinion came close to suggesting that, in
those situations where no public funds ended up in the hands
of the religious schools, there is no need to demonstrate that
aid was given to the student as a "result of the private deci-
sion of individual parents. 326 Perhaps the need for parents to
act as a prophylactic between church and state diminishes
when the aid is given directly to the student and never turned
over to the religious school, as such aid does not have the "pri-
mary effect" of advancing religion.
The majority might have reached a contrary conclusion if
it accepted the dissent's argument that the Title I aid "subsi-
dized the religious functions of the parochial schools by tak-
ing over a significant portion of their responsibility for teach-
ing secular subjects."3 27 The majority rejected this claim for
several reasons. Title I regulations forbade sectarian schools
to reduce the services they normally provided and replace
them with publicly funded services. 325 Nor was there any evi-
dence in the trial record of the sectarian schools violating this
regulation.329
Moreover, according to the majority, the alternative pro-
posed by the dissent did not provide any greater assurances
that the sectarian schools would not be equally relieved of
their responsibilities.33 ° Under the dissent's solution the same
Title I services would be offered to students in mobile units
parked at the curb in front of the religious school. 31 The dis-
323. Id.
324. Id. at 229.
325. Id. at 229.
326. Id. at 226 (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,
10 (1993)).
327. Id. at 250 (citing Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 371, 396-97 (1985)).
328. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 229.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 230.
331. Id. at 227-28.
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sent failed to "explain why a sectarian school would not have
the same incentive to 'make patently significant cutbacks' in
its curriculum no matter where Title I services are offered,
since the school would ostensibly be excused from having to
provide the Title I-type services itself."332
The dissent offered no rebuttal to this argument other
than the unsupported assertion that "off-premises teaching is
arguably less likely to open the door to relieving religious
schools of their responsibilities for secular subjects. The
dissent did not explain why a religious school would cut back
its responsibilities for teaching such subjects when a public
school teacher is in one of its classrooms, but not in response
to the same teacher providing the same services in a mobile
van parked sixty feet away.
Although Justice Souter thought that the majority's ar-
gument on this point "might prove too much," he shied away
(perhaps for good reason) from explaining this remark.34 He
may have meant to suggest that the majority had demon-
strated that providing Title I type aid to students anywhere
would relieve sectarian schools of substantial secular educa-
tional burdens. If so, he would be driven to conclude that
once students chose to attend a sectarian school, the state
must shun them by denying them any kind of educational
support anywhere. Presumably the constitutional implica-
tions of this position were untenable even for most of the dis-
senting members in this decision. The Court has long main-
tained that the Constitution does not require the state "to be
hostile to religion., 35 It is difficult to imagine how a Court
decision that forced states to refuse any remedial help to stu-
dents anywhere-simply because they chose to attend sectar-
ian schools-might be interpreted as anything but hostility
toward religion.
In addition to finding that the Title I program had the
impermissible "effect of advancing religion," the Aguilar
Court had also found that the program resulted in excessive
entanglement between church and state.336 The Agostini
Court also addressed that issue. The Court said that in the
332. Id. at 230 (quoting Souter, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 247.
334. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 246.
335. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
336. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985).
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past, the issue of excessive entanglement had been considered
as both part of the "effect" test and "as a factor separate and
apart from 'effect.' 33 7 The Court then proposed ceasing to
treat the analysis of "excessive entanglement" as an issue
separate from the "effect" inquiry on the grounds that the in-
quiry was "similar" in either instance.338 In both cases, the
Court looked at the "character and purpose of the institutions
benefited" and the "nature of the aid that the State pro-
vides."339 The second and third prongs of Lemon thus became
a single inquiry.
The Court argued that the finding of "excessive entan-
glement" in Aguilar rested upon three assumptions: "(i) the
program would require 'pervasive monitoring by public au-
thorities' to ensure that Title I employees did not inculcate re-
ligion; (ii) the program required 'administrative cooperation'
between the Board and parochial schools; and (iii) the pro-
gram might increase the dangers of 'political divisiveness.
The Court argued that under its current interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, the last two considerations standing
alone were insufficient to cause the "excessive entangle-
ment."" 1 The Court pointed out that no court had held that
the state could not offer the services provided under Title I off
campus." Regardless of where the state offered the services,
the same level of "administrative cooperation" and the same
incentives for "political divisiveness" were present. 3 Since
even the dissent was willing to brook the same level of "ad-
ministrative cooperation" and "political divisiveness" when
assistance was offered off campus, the Court saw those fac-
tors as insufficient to find a violation of the Establishment
Clause.3
As to the issue of "pervasive monitoring," the Court also
found no grounds for an Establishment Clause violation.345
The Aguilar Court had assumed that public school teachers
could not be trusted to avoid inculcating religious values
337. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232.
338. Id. at 232, 233.
339. Id. at 232.
340. Id. at 233 (quoting Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413-14).
341. Id. at 233-34.
342. Id. at 234.
343. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233-34.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 233.
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while on parochial schools grounds.34 As a result, the Court
further assumed that the state would require "pervasive
monitoring."'47 The Zobrest Court, however, had rejected the
assumption that teachers would violate the restrictions on in-
culcating religion.34 If the Court did not assume that teach-
ers would violate the prohibition against inculcating religion,
then it need not assume that the state would require "perva-
sive monitoring." The Court was satisfied that the (unan-
nounced) monthly visits by public school officials, which it did
not regard as "pervasive monitoring," would provide adequate
protection against violations by public school teachers. 9
Thus, the Court appears to have resolved the "catch-22" di-
lemma established in Lemon, at least for now.
III. IMPETUS FOR SCHOOL VOUCHERS
There is widespread concern that America's public
schools, particularly those that service poor inner city areas,
are not doing an adequate job of educating children.3 ° A vari-
ety of evidence suggests that American children's test results
are dropping both over time and in comparison to interna-
346. Id. at 234.
347. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412-13.
348. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
349. Id.
350. See generally DIANE RAVITCH, NATIONAL STANDARDS IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE (1995); John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Effec-
tive Schools and Equal Opportunity, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS
(Neal E. Devins ed., 1989); PETER W. COOKSON JR., SCHOOL CHOICE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICAN EDUCATION (1994). Cf Raymond Do-
manico, Catholic Schools in New York City (2001), at
http://www.heartland.orgPolicyBotTopic.cfm?artTopic=424 (unpublished report
prepared for New York University, Program on Education and Civil Society).
This report compares the academic performance of New York City's Catholic
elementary schools to the city's public schools, and finds that
Data analysis indicates that private schools in New York City are
bringing their students to higher levels of achievement than are public
schools, regardless of the number of poor and minority students. The
higher achievement of Catholic schools is much more pronounced in
grade 8 than in grade 4. In English language arts, there is a 17-point
difference between Catholic school and public school eighth graders
and a 20-point difference in mathematics. Catholic schools come closer
to breaking the link between race, family income, and student
achievement than do public schools. Catholic schools are more success-
ful at maintaining a basic level of achievement than are public schools.
The performance of poor and minority students in Catholic schools
demonstrates the educability of the city's youngsters.
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tional averages."'
One of the more intriguing proposals for responding to
this educational crisis is the concept of school vouchers. Al-
though specific proposals vary in their details, the general
concept involves providing parents with a check that they can
use to purchase private school education for their children.
352
The idea is that parents, operating under free market princi-
ples, will seek out the best possible education for their chil-
dren thus maximizing individual good. In addition, the com-
petition that results from these individual decisions will force
all schools to improve the quality of their educational pro-
grams in order to compete, consequently maximizing public
good.
The impetus for the idea's growing popularity, however,
extends beyond free market theory.353 The real force behind
this movement probably lies in the growing body of literature
suggesting that private schools, particularly religious based
private schools, do a better job of educating children in urban
areas than do public schools." Of course, not all researchers
agree about the positive impact of either vouchers or religious
351. See Michael Heise, Choosing Equal Educational Opportunity.- School
Reform, Law and Public Policy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (2001) (reviewing
JAY P. HEUBERT, LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING
EDUCATION EQUITY (1999) and SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY:
POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds.,
1999)) (noting that National Assessment of Educational Progress test results
indicate that science proficiency declined significantly for seventeen-year-olds
from 1969 to 1990, with some improvement during the 1980s but not enough to
meet 1970s levels, and citing the Third International Mathematics and Science
Study, which demonstrates that American students fall further and further be-
hind their international counterparts as they progress through the American
educational system).
352. See Allison M. Olczak, Note, Scaling the Wall Between Church and
State, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of School Vouchers, 89 KY. L.J. 507
(2000/2001) (providing a brief summary of the conceptual history of school
vouchers as developed by John Stuart Mill and Milton Friedman).
353. Milton Friedman, an economics professor at the University of Chicago,
launched the modern debate over school vouchers with the publication of
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM in 1962. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
354. See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS,
AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990); JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF
EDUCATION (1966); JAMES S. COLEMAN & THOMAS HOFFER, PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE HIGH SCHOOLS: THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITIES (1987); Raymond Do-
manico, Catholic Schools in New York City (2001) (unpublished manuscript
prepared for New York University, Program on Education and Civil Society).
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based education.355
Nonetheless, many parents of children in failing public
schools appear willing to take a chance on private religious
schools, if only because they have given up on the public
school system.5 6 Unlike scholars,357 parents do not care why
religious based private schools appear to outperform public
schools; they simply want their children to receive a quality
education. Absent a drastic improvement in the performance
of inner city public schools, or a significant dip in the per-
formance of private religious schools, the pressure for more
widespread use of vouchers is likely to continue."5 Parents of
children dramatically shortchanged by public schools will be
held at bay by constitutional arguments about separation of
church and state for only so long. Justice Stevens, for in-
stance, writes in the opening remarks of his dissent in Zel-
355. See generally KARL L. ALEXANDER & AARON M. PALLAS, PRIVATE
SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC POLICY: NEW EVIDENCE ON COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS IN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS (1983); see also Marla E. Sukstorf et al., A Re-
examination of Chubb and Moe's Politics Markets and America's Schools, in
SCHOOL CHOICE: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE 209 (Edith & Richard Rothstein
eds., 1993).
356. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 682 n.7 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas noted
Minority and low-income parents express the greatest support for pa-
rental choice and are most interested in placing their children in pri-
vate schools. "The appeal of private schools is especially strong among
parents who are low in income, minority, and live in low-performing
districts: precisely the parents who are the most disadvantaged under
the current system." Nearly three-fourths of all public school parents
with annual income less than $20,000 support vouchers, compared to
57 percent of public school parents with an annual income of over
$60,000. In addition, 75 percent of black public school parents support
vouchers, as do 71 percent of Hispanic public school parents.
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 164 (2001)); see also Frank Newport & Joseph Carroll,
No Public Consensus Yet on School Voucher Programs, GALLOP NEWS SERVICE
POLL ANALYSES (Jan. 15, 2001) (presenting a more comprehensive set of data
regarding public opinion and school vouchers).
357. See generally Stephen L. Morgan, Counterfactuals, Causal Effect Het-
erogeneity, and the Catholic School Effect on Learning, 74 SOC. OF EDUC. 341
(2001) (arguing that it is insufficient to offer only descriptive modeling justifica-
tions for the impact of Catholic schools without offering what is causing the im-
pact).
358. Polling data suggest that the school vouchers concept is gaining accep-
tance in the public's mind. Gallup data, for instance, indicates a general in-
crease in support over the last decade. See The 30th Annual Phi Delta
Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, available
at http://www.gallup.com/content/?ci=2122.
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man:
I think that we should ignore three factual matters that
are discussed at length by my colleagues. First, the severe
educational crisis that confronted the Cleveland City
School District when Ohio enacted its voucher program is
not a matter that should affect our appraisal of its consti-
tutionality .... Of course, the emergency may have given
some families a powerful motivation to leave the public
school system and accept religious indoctrination that
they would otherwise have avoided, but that is not a valid
reason for upholding the program.."9
Such remarks undoubtedly seem callous to parents with
children whose future prospects are rapidly diminishing. In
the end, the living, breathing Constitution will have to ac-
commodate the changing needs of the American educational
system or face the wrath of poor, angry parents who want
equal educational opportunities for their children.
As the case review in Part II suggest, at the same time
that policy considerations moved public opinion toward accep-
tance of school vouchers, the Supreme Court was slowly lay-
ing the legal groundwork for constitutional accommodation.
IV. SCHOOL VOUCHERS: ZELMAN V HARRIS
In Zelman v. Harris,36 the Court was asked to determine
whether the state of Ohio could continue to run a program
that allowed parents to pay tuition costs at religious schools
in part with public funds. The program consisted of two
kinds of aid: tuition scholarships, in the form of vouchers for
students who chose private schools within the district or pub-
lic schools outside their district, and tutorial aid for students
who remained in public schools.361
Ohio devised the voucher plan partly in response to the
fact that "for more than a generation . . . Cleveland's public
schools have been among the worst performing public schools
in the Nation." '362 The schools performed so poorly that a fed-
359. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 684. Justice Stevens offered no evidence to support
his conclusion that parents were being forced to accept "religious indoctrination"
against their wishes if they wanted to send their children to private schools. Id.
360. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
361. Id. at 645. The respondents did not question the constitutionality of the
tutorial program.
362. Id. at 644.
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eral district court relieved the local school board of its author-
ity and placed the entire city school system under state con-
trol.363 According to a state audit, the Cleveland school dis
trict "failed to meet any of the 18 state standards for minimal
acceptable performance" and "[o]nly 1 in 10 ninth graders
could pass a basic proficiency examination."" More than
two-thirds of the city's students failed or dropped out prior to
graduation. 65
The scholarship portion of the program allowed parents
to use the voucher at any public or private school, including
religious schools that met statewide educational standards.66
Public schools were eligible to receive the $2250 per-student
tuition scholarship voucher, plus the standard amount of
state aid the school normally received for each additional stu-
dent it enrolled.67 Payment to nonpublic schools varied ac-
cording to the financial needs of individual students and their
families.66 The plan provided that "[flamilies with incomes
below 200% of the poverty line are given priority and are eli-
gible to receive 90% of private school tuition up to $2,250. '' 36
The program restricted participating private schools to a co-
payment no greater than $250 for the lowest income fami-
lies.370 All families not meeting the lowest income require-
ments were eligible for tuition grants of up to $1875 with no
co-payment restrictions.3 7' But "[t]hese families receive tui-
tion aid only if the number of available scholarships exceeds
the number of low-income children who choose to partici-
pate. 372
Fifty-six private schools participated in the program, the
majority of which were religious institutions.373 None of the
area's public schools adjacent to the city agreed to participate




366. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645.
367. Id.




372. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646.
373. Specifically, eighty-two percent, or forty-six schools in the program were
religious. Id. at 647.
374. Id. at 647.
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arship program, of which ninety-six percent enrolled in reli-
gious schools.375 Sixty percent of the participating students
were members of families defined as impoverished.376
In response to the poor performance of the regular public
schools, Cleveland also developed, separate and apart from
the voucher program, public community and magnet
schools.377 The ten public community schools operating in the
Cleveland district in 1999-2000 enrolled over 1900 students.378
These schools, which were forbidden to have any religious af-
filiation, received twice the state funding as participating re-
ligious schools received in the program.379 Independent public
school boards ran the community schools.38 ° In the same year,
the twenty-three magnet schools enrolled more than 13,000
students for which they received $7746 in aid per student (the
same amount as the students enrolled in traditional public
schools).381
Applying the Lemon test as revised by Agostini, the
Court found that the program had the valid secular purpose
of assisting a "failing public schools system."3 2 The only re-
maining question for the Court was whether the program had
the unconstitutional "effect" of advancing religion.383 The ma-
jority found the program passed the "effect" test because it
dispensed benefits on a religiously neutral basis and because
any state aid that ended up in the hands of religious schools
did so only as a result of the genuine and independent choices
of private individuals.3" From the perspective of the majority,
those choices included remaining in traditional schools with
or without "tutoring," enrolling in community and magnet
schools, or attending private secular or religious schools.38
Led by Justice Souter, the dissenters found neither neu-
trality nor choice in the Cleveland program. Regarding neu-




378. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 647.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 647-48.
382. Id. at 649.
383. Id. at 649.
384. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662.
385. Id. at 655.
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since parents could not spend the vouchers at public schools
within the district, those schools should not be considered one
of the options available to students when determining if the
program was neutral."6 He argued that the only schools that
the Court could consider in the neutrality debate were those
that were a viable option for voucher recipients."" Having
taken the public schools out of the neutrality analysis, he
then argued that the amount of the voucher, $2250, was in-
sufficient to pay tuition at most of the city's secular private
schools 88 According to Justice Souter, the voucher's insuffi-
cient funding level forced parents to choose religious schools
whose tuition was considerably lower.8 9 As a result, the pro-
gram was not neutral in its treatment of religion because it
forced parents to choose religious schools for their children. °
Second, he compared the amount that the program's "tu-
toring" option made available to students who chose to stay in
public schools ($324 annually) to the amount that the pro-
gram made available to students who chose the voucher op-
tion ($2400 annually), and concluded that the significant dis-
parity implied bias in favor of religion. 9' Once again, the
program was not neutral in Justice Souter's view, because it
made more funds available for religious than for public
schools.392
For much the same reason, the dissent also maintained
that the program failed to provide true choice to aid recipi-
ents.9 Justice Souter argued that the majority "confused
choice in spending scholarships with choice from the entire
menu of possible educational placements."394  From the dis-
sent's perspective, the list of "choices" was limited to those
schools that actually could accept the voucher as payment. 95
The dissent rejected the notion that public schools should be
considered in the choice question because once individuals
chose the voucher program, they could no longer opt to spend
386. Id. at 697 (Souter, J., dissenting).
387. Id. at 697, 704-05.
388. Id. at 704-05.
389. Id. at 706-07.
390. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 705-07.
391. Id. at 697-98.
392. Id. at 697-98.
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the money at those public schools within the district.196 Once
again, as in the neutrality analysis, Justice Souter argued
that the amount of the voucher, $2250, was insufficient to pay
tuition at most of Cleveland's secular private schools.3 97 In
the smaller pool of choices available to voucher recipients,
eighty-two percent of the participating schools turned out to
be religious schools.9 Therefore, the program did not satisfy
the choice requirement because parents did not have a sig-
nificant number of nonreligious schools from which to
choose.399
The dissent found further evidence of the lack of choice in
the fact that ninety-six percent of the students who partici-
pated in the voucher program chose to attend religious
schools.00 According to Justice Souter, this lack of choice re-
sulted because there were too few slots available in private
secular schools for voucher holders, and because the amount
of the voucher was insufficient to cover tuition costs at pri-
vate secular schools.4"' Nor could this overwhelming selection
of religious schools be a reflection of parents' religious choices,
since two-thirds of the children attended schools not of their
faith.0 2
Not surprisingly, the majority saw the case quite differ-
ently. Justice Rehnquist began his analysis by arguing that
the Court's decisions had drawn a "consistent distinction" be-
tween state sponsored programs that gave aid directly to reli-
gious schools and neutral programs of "true private choice,"
where state aid reached religious schools "only as a result of




According to Justice Rehnquist, the determining issue in
the neutrality analysis was whether "the program differenti-
ates based on the religious status of beneficiaries or providers
396. As noted earlier, none of the public schools in the adjacent districts that
could have received the funds chose to participate in the program. See Zelman,
536 U.S. at 647.
397. Id. at 706-07.
398. Id. at 647.
399. Id. at 707.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 704.
403. Id. at 649 (citing Muller, Witters, and Zobrest).
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of services."4 4 Receipt of benefits was not conditional on any
sort of religious commitment, or lack thereof, by parents,
children, or schools.4"5 The program allowed parents to spend
the aid at any private school within the district, or any public
school in an adjacent district, regardless of religious or nonre-
ligious affiliation."6 According to the majority, the program
gave public schools located outside the district a special fi-
nancial incentive to participate that was not provided to reli-
gious schools. 407 The Court found additional evidence of neu-
trality in the impetus for the program: the state designed the
program to provide assistance to children in a failing school
system.4 8 Any benefit to religion was incidental to the state's
goal of aiding children, rather than a result of the state's
preference for religion.4 9 Justice Rehnquist noted that the
only preference in the program was for students from low-
income families.4 0
Further, the Court found proof of the program's neutral-
ity in the fact that there were no "'financial incentives' that
'skew[ed]' the program toward religious schools., 411 On the
contrary, the state built disincentives into the program for
parents wishing to choose religious schools and for religious
schools themselves. Parents who chose private religious (or
private nonreligious) schools had to pay tuition co-payments
that parents choosing public community or magnet schools
did not have to pay.41 ' Private schools received state assis-
tance one-half to two-thirds less than community or magnet
schools, respectively.41 Again, participating public schools in
adjacent school districts were eligible to receive two or three
times the government assistance that private religious
schools could receive under the program.4 4 To the extent that
the program was skewed at all, argued the majority, it
404. Id. at 654 n.3.
405. Id. at 653.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 653.
411. Id. (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
487-88 (1986)).
412. Id. at 654.
413. Id. at 654.
414. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 654.
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pushed parents toward public schools.415
In addition, the majority argued that Justice Souter mis-
calculated the total amount of aid available to students who
chose the "tutoring" program.416 Students who chose the "tu-
tor" option caused the state to provide its public schools with
$4167 in regular aid plus the $324 in tutorial assistance.1
This amount far exceeded the $2250 maximum amount pri-
vate religious schools could receive under the program. From
the majority's perspective, the program was neutral because
it did not provide financial incentives that steered individuals
toward religious schools. 18
Moving on to the issue of "choice," the majority argued
that "[t]here also is no evidence that the program fails to pro-
vide genuine opportunities for Cleveland parents to select
secular educational options. 4 1 9  The majority argued that
Cleveland's schoolchildren had a wide range of educational
options that included staying in public school, with or without
"tutoring," attending a community or magnet school, or en-
rolling in a private secular or sectarian school.4 2' According to
the majority, the key to assessing the constitutionality of the
Cleveland program was to ask whether Ohio was forcing chil-
dren to attend religious schools.42' In order to answer that
question properly, the majority believed that it had to con-
sider all of the educational options available to Cleveland's
schoolchildren, including public schools that were not part of
the program.422
That eighty-two percent of the private schools were reli-
gious was not grounds for declaring the program unconstitu-
tional, according to the majority.423 Because eighty-one per-
cent of Cleveland's private schools had been religious schools
before the program was created, 24 the program did not cause
this disparity. Indeed, the relative percentage of secular to
sectarian schools that participated in the program reflected a
415. Id.
416. Id. at 654 n.3.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 654.
419. Id. at 655.
420. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655.
421. Id. at 655-56.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 655.
424. Id. at 657.
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cross-section of religious-nonreligious private schools.4 25 The
majority argued that if this sort of statistical evidence were
used to declare programs unconstitutional, it would lead to
uneven and absurd results.426 Two identical programs in two
different cities might result in two different constitutional
rulings simply because one city had a higher percentage of
secular private schools.427
Justice Rehnquist also noted that although the program
spurred the creation of "several" new nonreligious schools, it
had not spurred the creation of any new religious schools.428
The creation of the new secular private schools occurred de-
spite the litigation before the Court, which had served as a
"barrier to entry" for such schools because the litigation
threatened the continued financial commitment from the
state.429
The majority likewise rejected Justice Souter's complaint
that insufficient funding levels forced students, who would
otherwise have chosen the more expensive private secular
schools, to attend religious schools. 4 ' The majority pointed
out that ten private secular schools found the funding levels
sufficient.4 1 Justice Rehnquist further noted that "not a scin-
tilla of evidence" had been produced at trial to support the
claim that any private secular school refused to participate
because funding levels were too low.
42
For similar reasons, the majority rejected Justice
Souter's claim that the fact that ninety-six percent of voucher
425. Id.
426. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 657.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 656 n.4.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 656-57.
431. Id. at 656 n.4.
432. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 656 n.4 (quoting Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234
F.3d 945, 970 (6th Cir. 2000) (Ryan, J., concurring)). Justice Souter appears to
devise yet another "catch-22" for the state. If the state failed to provide enough
funding to pay for expensive private secular schools, he claimed that it steered
students toward religious schools. If the state did provide enough money for
students to choose expensive private secular schools, then it would inevitably
also transfer more money to religious schools, which Souter found just as objec-
tionable. He left no doubt that he would find a constitutional objection either
way when, after complaining that the funding levels were insufficient to pay for
most secular private schools, he went on to write: "It is not, of course, that I
think even a genuine choice criteria is up to the task of the Establishment
Clause when substantial state funds go to religious teaching." Id. at 703.
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holders chose religious schools was evidence that the program
did not offer parents real choice.433  Citing Mueller and
Agostini, Justice Rehnquist said that "[tihe Constitutionality
of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on
whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time,
most private schools are run by religious organizations, or
most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school."4 "
He also noted that the ninety-six percent statistic failed to ac-
count for the 1900 students enrolled in community schools,
the 13,000 children attending magnet schools, or the 1400
students in traditional schools who chose the "tutoring" op-
tion."5 When these choices were taken into account, the per-
centage of students who chose religious schools dropped to
under twenty percent.436 Justice Rehnquist also pointed out
that the ninety-six percent figure was applicable to one par-
ticular year and that, in the 1997-1998 school year, only sev-
enty-eight percent of voucher holders chose religious
schools.437
Justice Souter was not impressed by these figures be-
cause he and the other dissenters believed that the Court
should not be including options that were not a formal part of
the program in the calculation.43 For Justice Souter, the
433. Id. at 658-60.
434. Id. at 658.
435. Id. at 659.
436. Id.
437. Id. Justice Rehnquist cited evidence from a similar program in Milwau-
kee to support the statistical point. Milwaukee experienced a five-fold increase
in the number of nonreligious schools participating in its program over a twelve-
year period. During the same period, the number of students attending private
secular schools increased from 337 to 3,582. Justice Rehnquist suggested that
the private secular schools were attracted to the program after the Wisconsin
Supreme Court declared the program constitutional. Id. at 659 n.5. This exam-
ple points out yet again one of the many "catch-22s" that face states wishing to
address the needs of failing students. The threat of First Amendment litigation
suppresses participation levels on the part of private secular schools that no
doubt need to know that funding levels will be likely to continue if they invest in
the additional resources necessary to accept voucher students. But the fact that
some members of the Court seem to invite litigation creates uncertainty that
may scare private secular schools away. Those members then point to the low
levels of participation by private secular schools as evidence of the lack of
choice. It will be interesting to monitor the impact of the Court's decision in
Zelman on participation rates by such schools. A five to four decision may not
provide the sort of certainty that could definitively encourage increased partici-
pation.
438. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 698-99.
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point of the "choice" test was to provide the Court with a tool
for weeding out educational aid programs that provided funds
to religious schools.439 For the majority, the point of the choice
test was clearly different. The majority saw the choice test as
a means of upholding the Constitution's guarantee that no
one would be forced to subscribe to a religious act or view
against his or her will." ° Under Justice Souter's approach,
even if individuals were absolutely free from any coercion by
the state, because they can choose not to participate in the
program, the program is unconstitutional if too many of those
that do participate attend religious schools.
It is not immediately clear why, in determining whether
a program is neutral or whether choice exists, the Court
should turn a blind eye to funds provided to public schools, or
to other educational options that are not funneled through
the program. Such an approach would make sense only if
students were forced into the program and could not opt for a
nonreligious school choice. In that case, the only fund-
ing/choice that individuals would have would be the one that
accompanied the private religious school that the state forced
them to attend. But the state is not "directing" aid to reli-
gious schools if parents have legitimate secular school op-
tions, be they public or private. In Cleveland's case, students
had the option of not participating in the program at all by
remaining in their regular schools, attending community or
magnet schools, participating while remaining in public
schools with tutors, or participating by selecting private reli-
gious or secular schools."' In such cases, it is reasonable to
consider all those choices, and any aid that accompanies all of
those choices, when considering the neutrality/choice issue.
One way to understand the majority's position would be
to imagine that Cleveland adopted an "All Vouchers" educa-
tional system. In such a system, the state would give every
student a voucher to purchase education, and the state would
not assign any student to public schools by default. Students
would then choose on which of the various school choices they
would spend their money. In such a system, if the state of-
439. Id. at 699. Justice Souter wrote "Defining choice as choice in spending
the money or channeling the aid is, moreover, necessary if the choice criterion is
to function as a limiting principle at all." Id. at 700.
440. Id. at 662-63.
441. Id. at 655.
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fered students who chose the public schools two to three times
as much aid as those who chose the private religious schools,
with an additional grant of $324 to all students who chose the
public schools system with tutoring assistance, no one could
question the program's neutrality. An "All Vouchers" educa-
tional system of this kind would obviously be skewed toward
public schools. The only difference between an "All Voucher"
system and the one actually challenged in Zelman were for-
mal legal definitions. Considered from the perspective of stu-
dents or parents, the choices were virtually identical, and the
legal definitions did not restrict the "choices" available to par-
ents or children.
Yet another way to understand the majorities' position
would be to view the educational choices from the perspective
of a poor family that has just moved into Cleveland. Such a
family could indeed choose from among all the choices the
majority claimed were available. Nothing about the state's
voucher program would encourage the family to choose reli-
gious schools, other than the better education opportunities
available at private sectarian schools, which the state did
nothing to help create. From the perspective of such a family,
Cleveland would offer many genuine educational choices
without any pressure to choose one over the other.
This was exactly the position of every poor family in
Cleveland that participated in the voucher program whether
or not they had recently moved to the city. The only families
that were not given this range of choices were those that were
not poor. Such families were actually pressured by Ohio to
accept public education because, for them, the state offered
considerably reduced subsidies. Again, if we are to be per-
suaded by Justice Souter's position that the only choices that
should be considered were those that were available after the
family chose the voucher program, we should demand some
evidence that the parents had no choice but to select the
voucher program in the first instance. No such evidence ex-
ists.
Even if the Court considered only the choices available to
students after they opt for the voucher program, contrary to
Justice Souter's assertion, it must consider whether the state
sought to promote religion by discouraging the participation
758 Vol: 44
SCHOOL VOUCHERS
of secular schools." 2 The state of Ohio offered a financial in-
centive to adjacent public school districts to encourage them
to participate in the program. 3 That none chose to partici-
pate had nothing to do with the state wishing to force stu-
dents to choose religious schools. On the contrary, all of the
adjacent public schools that opted not to participate in the
program likely had a motive for wishing to see the program
fail. Voucher programs like Cleveland's threaten to break the
monopoly that public school systems have on education in
America. Under Justice Souter's analysis, refusal to partici-
pate strengthened the position of those seeking to have the
program declared unconstitutional.' Ironically, had Justice
Souter had his way, the Court would have interpreted behav-
ior by the adjacent public schools that may have been deliber-
ately intended to harm religious schools as promoting relig-
ion. Public school officials wishing to suppress competition
from private schools should not be able to decide the constitu-
tional fate of a voucher program like Cleveland's.
Justice Souter also argued that when ninety-six percent
of the students who participate in such programs chose reli-
gious schools, it served as evidence that parents do not have
real choices."5  This is particularly likely he argued, when
two-thirds of such children choose schools that do not reflect
their religious affiliation."6 According to Justice Souter, the
real explanation for the overwhelming choice of religious
schools was the paltry funding levels of the vouchers that
were insufficient to pay for private secular schools."7
This argument assumes that most parents were too poor
to supplement the voucher so that their children could attend
more expensive private secular schools. But the fact was that
about forty percent of the students participating in the pro-
gram were from families that were not considered poor.448
442. See id. at 656 n.4. Justice Souter argued that "it is entirely irrelevant
that the state did not deliberately design the network of private schools for the
sake of channeling money into religious schools." Id. at 707. While it may not
be dispositive, such evidence can hardly be "irrelevant" if the Court is seeking to
discover whether the state is forcing students into religious schools.
443. Id. at 654.
444. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 700.
445. Id. at 658.
446. Id. at 704.
447. See id. at 704-05.
448. Id. at 710 n.21 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that at least sixty percent
of participating students were below the poverty line).
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Some portion of those families almost certainly could have af-
forded to supplement the voucher had they wished to have
their children attend nonreligious schools. That they none-
theless chose religious schools suggests that the choice had
little to do with insufficient state funding.
Equally plausible, and no less supported by the record
than Justice Souter's assumption, is the possibility that reli-
gious tensions have so abated in America that many parents
feel free to have their children attend religious schools out-
side their own faith. Whatever the explanation, it is clear
that the state was not forcing students to attend religious
schools against their will.
V. CONCLUSION
Those who would brook greater interplay between church
and state must remember that there are legitimate reasons
for maintaining a reasonable level of division between relig-
ion and government in America. If either institution becomes
too involved with the affairs of the other it could lead to in-
fringement of individual liberty and that might become the
bases for social unrest. Current events throughout the world
warn us of the continuing danger that can result when these
two powerful forces are intimately united. Conversely, in-
fringement of individual religious liberty and social unrest
can also result if government is perceived to be the enemy of
religion. As it seeks to strike a balance between these two
dangerous extremes, the Court needs to be ever mindful of
the core purpose of the First Amendment-the need to protect
every individual's liberty to accept or reject religious beliefs.
Given the dangers that might result if the state interferes
with this liberty by appearing to favor or oppose religion, the
Court ought to avoid devising tests that restrict its flexibility
in this area.
Fortunately, the Court seems to be moving away from the
less flexible three-part test it devised in Lemon in favor of a
more flexible approach to church and state cases. While
bright line tests have intrinsic appeal because of the certainty
they provide, they generally prove too rigid to deal with the
great variety of cases that are certain to arise in areas like
the First Amendment. The Court may wish to consider re-
turning to the more malleable approach it used in Zorach.
There, as noted above, the Court implied that whenever state
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action threatened the principle of "free exercise" or came close
to actual "establishment," separation must be "complete and
unequivocal."" 9 When, however, state actions infringe upon
neither of these principles, the Court suggested that it would
allow greater interplay between these two institutions.45 °
This approach has the great benefit of allowing the Court to
recognize, in cases like Zelman, that the state is neither at-
tempting to interfere with anyone's religious liberty nor es-
tablishing a religion.
The Court's decision in Zelman is consistent with this
approach. Any voucher program that does nothing either to
favor or discourage religion and that offers parents real
choices such that the state does not force anyone to attend a
religious school against his or her will ought to be found con-
stitutional. This notion is particularly true as America strug-
gles to find innovative solutions to reverse the failure of inner
city public schools. Extremely narrow interpretations of the
Establishment Clause that turn their back on these problems
will do neither the Constitution nor the American educational
system justice.
449. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
450. Id. at 312-13.
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